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INTRODUCTION
Senator Russell Long recognized decades ago that "U.S. trade
policy has been the orphan of United States foreign policy."' Prior to
1962, trade issues were largely administered through the State De-
partment because trade was a part of the foreign policy utilized by
the United States, for various geopolitical reasons, during the Cold
War. Trade policies were compiled on an ad hoc basis, 2 a product of
lobbying efforts by domestic, and at times, foreign constituents. Al-
though the United States has a history of undertaking trade work
within organized international frameworks-whether multilateral,
regional, or bilateral negotiating fora-there has always been room
for unilateral, and often, aggressive trade practices.
Much of United States trade policy was caught up predominately
in the superpower rivalry of the Cold War. As a result, the United
States was willing to enter into non-reciprocal agreements with
trading partners, placing economic and political priorities ahead of
trade interests. In the 1960s, for example, Washington was largely
antagonistic towards regional trading bloc formation, but made an
exception for the European Common Market. The United States
viewed Western Europe's regional moves in the context of a poten-
tial Communist threat, and economic cooperation as necessary for
permanent European peace. Simultaneously, the United States fa-
vored a focus on specific countries for geopolitical, strategic, and
1. I.M. DESTLER, MAKING FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 170 (1980) (detailing
how trade deficits reflected the idea that trade policies had been relinquished for
political objectives).
2. See Ronald N. Brand, GA TT and United States Trade Law: The Incomplete
hnplementation of Comparative Advantage Theory, 2 J. LEGAL ECON. 95, 102
(1992).
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trade reasons-welcoming in the first wave of bilateral free trade
agreements in the 1960s.
In this seemingly rich and diverse set of policy decisionmaking,
scholars have attempted to find consistency in United States trade
relations. One school of thought pursues trade with an eye towards
economic interdependence and security issues. These scholars be-
lieve that high technology industries are of utmost importance for
American "military security, competitiveness in international trade,
and domestic economic vigor."'
Other analysts examine the basic market principles behind United
States trade policy, although it is impossible that coherent and work-
able trade regulations could derive completely from an efficiency
analysis. According to one analyst, "the economic analysis upon
which enduring neoclassical international trade practices have relied
has become increasingly irrelevant."5 Professor Paul Krugman ex-
pressed his agreement when he stated, "[t]he new thinking about
trade ... makes one thing clear: the idealized theoretical model on
which the classical case for free trade is based will not serve us any-
more. The world is more complex than that."6
For governments, there are an increasing number of ways to ap-
proach trade policy, just as for academics there are a number of
paradigms through which to analyze these changes. The post-modem
analysis of trade policy is one method to unite the varying strands of
3. David B. Bobrow & Robert T. Kudrle, Economic Interdependence and Se-
curity: U.S. Trade and Investment Policy for a New Era, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 61, 61 (1994) (explaining this theory of trade policy and noting that the
Clinton Administration adheres to this idea).
4. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International
Trade, 100 HARv. L. REv. 546, 550 (1987) (rejecting the market correction model
since no model can be formed representing international trade).
5. Mark S. Ehrlich, Comment, Towards a New Dialogue Between Interna-
tional Relations Theory and International Trade Theory, 2 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 259, 262 (1997).
6. Paul R. Krugrnan, hItroduction: New Thinking About Trade Policv, in
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 15 (Paul
R. Krugman ed., 1986) [hereinafter STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY] (explaining how
the current trade policy can no longer be based on the classical model and men-
tioning that this complexity raises the possibilities of "activist trade or industrial
policy").
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United States trade policy.' Both an evolving philosophy and a cul-
tural movement, post-modernism is difficult to describe.' According
to Jean-Frangois Lyotard, the leading French theoretician, post-
modernism "designates the state of our culture following the trans-
formations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have al-
tered the game rules for science, literature, and the arts." 9 In short,
the history of ideas has been predominated by metanarratives, or,
overarching theories that profess ultimate truths. Post-modernism or
post-modernity' explodes the myth that anyone, or any school of
7. See Ehrlich, supra note 5, at 260 (attempting to fuse the concepts of inter-
national relations theory and international economics theory by examining the im-
portance of "new theories in international relations to problems in international
trade and economics"). Several law review articles discuss the relationship be-
tween post-modernism and international affairs. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Trade
Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Or-
ganization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 835 (1995) (conceptualizing and critiquing three
competing approaches to WTO legalism, each of which is grounded in interna-
tional relations theory); J.A. Lindgren Alves, The United Nations, Postmodernity,
and Human Rights, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998) (stating that post-modernity
pervades every field of human science, including the study of international rela-
tions).
8. See Linda Hutcheon, Theorising the Postmodern Towards a Poetics, in THE
POST-MODERN READER 76, 76 (Charles A. Jencks ed., 1992). "[P]ostmodemism is
a contradictory phenomenon, one that uses and abuses, installs and then subverts,
the very concepts it challenges-be it in architecture, literature, painting, sculpture,
film, video, dance, TV, music, philosophy, aesthetic theory, psychoanalysis, lin-
guistics, or historiography." Id. See generally JEAN-FRANQOIS LYOTARD, LE
POSTMODERNE EXPLIQUt AUX ENFANTS (1988) (responding to the question, "what
is post-modernism?"); STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989) (de-
scribing the role of post-modernism debate that exists in this subject in the areas of
art, culture, drama, and popular cultural studies); CHARLES JENCKS, WHAT IS
POSTMODERNISM? (1989) (defining the concept of post-modernism as it relates to
architecture); FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF
LATE CAPITALISM (1991) (arguing that "post-modem" as a theoretical underpin-
ning can not accurately be used in this era of post-imperialism); TERRY EAGLETON,
THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM (1996) (examining post-modernism as a whole
and detailing the culture of the subject).
9. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE xxiii (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1994) (providing a
background to Lyotard's theory of post-modernism).
10. See STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL
INTERROGATIONS 2 (1991) (utilizing the term "post-modernity" to describe the
"period which allegedly follows modernity"). The authors of this book distinguish
"post-modernity" from "post-modernism." See id. "Post-modernity" refers to the
"supposed epoch that follows modernity," and "post-modernism" describes the
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thought, can have a monopoly on the truth." There are, instead, com-
peting narratives that all vie for their proper place in the history of
ideas.'
2
Using deconstructionalist tools, post-modernists apply antifounda-
tionalist epistemology, and soundly reject the post-Enlightenment
project. 3 The post-modernists distrust such constructs as reason, sci-
ence, and other foundations of Western society, recognizing them as
power plays. It is no wonder that some have criticized post-modem-
ists for their nihilism and lack of grounded principles:' 4
[T]here is no unified postmodern theory, or even a coherent set of posi-
tions. Rather, one is struck by the diversities between theories lumped to-
gether as 'postmodem' and the plurality-often conflictual-of postmod-
em positions. One is also struck by the inadequate and undertheorized
notion of the ' ostmodem' in the theories which adopt, or are identified
in, such terms.
Despite these weaknesses in the theoretic underpinnings of post-
modernism, it has received some treatment in the fields of intema-
"movement and artifacts in the cultural field that can be distinguished from mod-
ernist movements, texts, and practices." Id. at 5.
11. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 3 (1995) (noting that "[p]ostmodemism is an
aesthetic practice and condition that is opposed to 'Grand Theory,' structural pat-
terns, or foundational knowledges.").
12. See id. at 5. There is fascinating discourse over whether post-modernism is
the natural step from modernism or whether something must first be post-
modernist to become modernist. This discourse is the stuff of Parisian coffee-
houses and philosophy lectures and shall not be discussed herein. Some theorists
view post-modemism as a cultural movement which precedes modernism. See id.
Other analysts see post-modemism as a metahistorical category cutting across eras
of cultural history. See UMBERTO Eco, POSTSCRIPT TO THE NAME OF THE ROSE 67
(1983) "The postmodem reply to the modem consists of recognizing that the past,
since it cannot really be destroyed, because its destruction leads to silence, must be
revisited: but with irony, not innocently." Id.
13. For an examination into the discord created by the Post-Enlightenment, see
generally Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-
Enlightenment Culture, 47 EMORY L.J. 163 (1998).
14. See generally, e.g., CHRISTOPHER NORRIs, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
POSTMODERNISM (1990) (critiquing various exponents of the post-modem philoso-
phy).
15. BEST & KELLNER, supra note 10, at 2.
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tional relations and international economics. This global extension
seems obvious to Charles Jencks, who stated that "[i]n the last ten
years post-modernism has become more than a social condition and
cultural movement, it has become a world view."' 6 Therefore, it is no
surprise that the international system regulating international trade
has been approached from a post-modern perspective. For Professor
David Kennedy:
The international trade regime, even at its most imperious, does not see it-
self disabling the mechanisms of national or local legislation, does not as-
pire to replace the institutions of public law, still less to establish an inter-
national state. International economic law reorients us away from the level
at which the regime operates and toward its substantive spirit or policy
orientation. 7
It is difficult to identify such a spirit given the "degree of intel-
lectual inconsistency"'' 8 that exists. Therefore, it should not be any
surprise that United States policy shares this search for a policy ori-
entation. When Stuart Eizenstat testified before the United States
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, he outlined such a spirit in the
government's foreign economic policy, stating that this spirit is "to
16. Charles Jencks, The Post-Modern Agenda, in THE POST-MODERN READER,
supra note 8, at 10, 10.
17. David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. OF INT'L L. 1, 12
(1994) For a more detailed look into the new legal structure of United States feder-
alism as it affects federal trade law, see Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements
and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45, 48 (1998). "In the 1990s
trade agreement negotiations are no longer solely a matter of the national executive
branch exercising a national government prerogative. Instead, negotiations now
follow the new "partnering" approach between the executive branches and the
states." Id.
18. See Brand, supra note 2, at 101 (asserting that "the relationship between the
law and its intellectual underpinnings remains enigmatic"); see also Martti Ko-
skenniemi & Marja Lehto, The Privilege of Universality: International Law, Eco-
nomic Ideology and Seabed Resources, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 533, 533 (1996) (as-
serting that the "new international economic order.., displays the cunning of legal
reason as it works to produce co-operation from diametrically opposed public po-
sitions and legitimacy from empty legal principles and institutions"). "Since 1945
there has been a movement of thought which seeks to understand an economic
system by reference to hypothetical human beings with hypothetical ideas and
aims, rather than by refererence to the subjectivity, the ideas and aims, of actual
human beings." Philip Allott, The Nation as Mind Politic, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1361, 1370 (1992).
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lead in opening up the arteries of [international] trade, . . support
peace processes,... and to follow through in developing strong eco-
nomic partnerships . . . around the world. ' Due to the increasing
globalization of economies, the economic health of the country de-
pends considerably on its ability to have access to markets abroad.
Ninety-five percent of the world's consumers live beyond the bor-
ders of the United States.20 Consequently, the United States govern-
ment understands that it must foster freer trade internationally for
domestic producers to expand their markets.
What the United States government does not clarify, however, is
the manner in which freer trade is to be facilitated. In other words,
what is the substantive spirit in trade? The United States does not
know whether it wants to be a bilateral trader, a leader in a set of re-
gional trading pacts, or part of the world's multilateral trading re-
gime. In reality, the United States wants to lead all and none of these
efforts at the same time. For example, on April 30, 1993, the United
States government threatened trade sanctions against Brazil, India,
Japan, and other states." At the same time, however, President
Clinton stated that he wanted to take all necessary steps to complete
the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") negotiations.' This demonstrates America's post-modem
policies. On one hand, the Clinton Administration sang the praises of
global markets and pledged its commitment to the liberalization of
trade regimes. On the other, it barked threats of sanctions if would-be
partners did not open their borders to American products and com-
petition. In short, American trade policy has become a cocktail of re-
19. Statement for the Record by' Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat Under Secre-
tary-Designate for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs: Nomination
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign ReL, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (state-
ment of Stuart Eizenstat) (on file with American University International Law Re-
view) [hereinafter Eizenstat Testimony]. Stuart Eizenstat is currently Undersecre-
tary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs. He is the former
Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, and United States Ambassa-
dor to the European Union.
20. See id.
21. See Drift Over Trade, ECONOMIST, May 8, 1993, at 18 (noting that the
Clinton trade policy only makes sense if the threatened sanctions are carried out).
22. See id. (explaining that President Clinton tried to advance the Uruguay
Round talks through his support of the GATT's new Director-General, Peter Suth-
erland).
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constructed bilateralism and hyper-regionalism mixed with cautious
multilateralism. The ingredients are all competing narratives vying
for the predominant position in the trade policy formulation process.
This Article examines the three strands that form United States
trade policy. Part I considers multilateralism, as evidenced by the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round GATT talks and the recent spate
of World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute resolution procedures
to which the United States government has subscribed. The Clinton
Administration has significantly played the multilateralism card,
putting stock into rules-based collective solutions to issues of inter-
national trade.
Part II analyzes the trend of regionalism and the march towards
regional trading blocs. As the European Union and Japan move to-
wards consolidating their respective trading power bases, the United
States also is in overdrive in its effort to carve out new regional
trading blocs. Building on the success of the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),23 the United States is intent on ex-
panding American trade to the rest of Latin America through the
Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"). 24 Looking to the Pacific
Rim, the United States has lead efforts to increase the role of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC")" forum as a legiti-
mate trading bloc.
Part III turns to the increased use of unilateral measures, irrespec-
tive of current negotiations in multilateral and regional contexts and
their emerging arrangements. On the unilateral front, the United
States has pushed the limits of international law through the extrater-
ritorial application of American laws and through the enforcement of
United States trade legislation, perhaps to the detriment of long-term
relations with traditional trading partners. Threats of trade wars, be it
with the European Union, Japan, Brazil, or India, abound. The
United States government's negotiating style has taken a decisively
23. Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605.
24. See Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action,
Dec. 11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808, 811 (1995) (noting that the United States planned to
increase world trade by reducing barriers to trade and investment).
25. See APEC SECRETARIAT, ASIA-PACIFIC COOPERATION, SELECTED APEC
DOCUMENTS, 1995, at 1 (stating the treaty's purpose is to open trade with Asia and
the Pacific).
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robust tenor as the United States Trade Representative acts like a
spoiled child if the United States does not get its way.
Part IV examines the intellectual inconsistency of international
trade policy in general and that of the United States in particular. In
an era of competing constituencies and a cornucopia of options, the
seemingly diverse and counter-indicating spirits that emanate from
the United States government concerning trade policy may not be
post-modem at all. The one over-arching theme that brings together
the trifurcated approach is American self-interest. But as these poli-
cies merge, there is often discord felt in world markets, government
negotiators, foreign businesses, and traditional allies. Events can of-
ten spin out of control and unfold so quickly that a truly focused, co-
hesive, and consistent response is close to impossible. This may be
the Clintonian "just in time" practice of management-the mainstay
of his administration to date. 6 After all, these are millennial days in
which everything appears post-modem.
I. MULTILATERALISM: A POST-MODERN
APPROACH TO UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY
On May 1, 1997, Stuart Eizenstat told the United States Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that:
[T]he United States must continue to lead in opening up the arteries of
trade in the international trading system ... Our continuing leadership in
opening markets is essential to enhancing the prosperity and security of
the American people in the 21' century and binding the peoples of the
world together in a chain of prosperity and shared interests.-
This statement correctly defines the Clinton Administration's current
trade policy: multilateralism.
The United States' faith in multilateralism is apparent on several
fronts. First, the United States government has maintained a strong
belief in the world-trading regime as the cornerstone process of trade
26. See James M. Cooper, Creative Problem Solving and the Castro Conun-
drum, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 391, 398 (1998) (examining foreign policy in light of
United States relations with Cuba). President Clinton's policy is calibrated; small
shifts in Cuban policy are met with small shifts in American policy. See id.
27. Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 2.
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liberalization. Second, the United States appears eager to test the dis-
pute mechanisms of the WTO, the very process that simultaneously
legitimates and regulates the rules-based multilateral trade regime.
Third, the United States continues to push for liberalization. As mar-
kets open in new sectors of the global economy and the WTO re-
duces barriers to trade, it is clear that the United States remains a
strong advocate of the multilateral process.
A. HISTORY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
Before the Second World War, all trading states had erected trade
barriers because of worldwide depression and subsequent protec-
tionist policies. The six years of armed conflict that engulfed the
world further exacerbated this system.
Subsequently, the free movement of goods and services was a
fundamental pillar of the post-war architecture created during the
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Since that time, the United
States has been the world's leader in pushing for international freer
trade flows. Successive United States Presidents, both Republican
and Democratic, and concurrent Congresses, have led the effort to
force open foreign markets to international competition, which really
means United States firms. In the post-1945 era, the GATT28 has
been the main tool of American foreign policy to accomplish open
markets globally.29
Free trade and economic interdependence would avert war in the
future, with the GATT system assisting in that endeavor."0 The non-
Communist trading states of the world could engage in this highly
structured multilateral process. Clearly, free marketry and the trans-
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-Il,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
29. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 10 (1970) (asserting that the GATT was both a product of United
States planning, as well as predominant American economic ideology in the post-
World War II era).
30. But see PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: HOW AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE BEING SACRIFICED TO THE GODS OF THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 61 (1998) ("GATT was the Magna Carta of the multination-
als."). "In the global arena, politics trump economics, and it is relative, not abso-
lute, power that counts. Nations will abide by the rules of an international system
as long as that system works to their advantage." Id. at 65-66.
966 [14:957
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parency of open borders for trade assisted United States geopolitical
goals. With the world divided into two camps, American policymak-
ers pursued such multilateral endeavors believing that there would be
strength in numbers.
The end of the Cold War gave impetus to form a new trade or-
ganization-one with rules, dispute settlement mechanisms, and
sanctions.' Through eight GATT negotiating rounds, the United
States has been able to reduce trade barriers around the world in a
systematic fashion." The resulting framework is the culmination of
half a century of multilateral negotiations.
Although formal negotiations began in the Reagan era, the Bush
Administration initiated a new era of GATT talks-the Uruguay
Round.3 The United States was the strongest proponent of the Uru-
guay Round. This effort involved more than the traditional reduction
of tariff rates.
With financial and other services accounting for 70 percent of the Ameri-
can GNP, American agriculture in serious trouble, and rising protectionist
pressures in Congress, the United States demanded that other nations
open their economies to American service industries, including American
multinationals, remove agricultural export subsidies, and write down rules
preventing the piracy of patents, trademarks, and other forms of intellec-
tual property rights.3
In the face of French intransigence during the Uruguay Round,
the resolution of issues involving agricultural trade proved virtually
31. See DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 288
(1994) (arguing that "[t]he collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1990 knocked away the
security-issue foundations of the postwar trading system"). The need for a united
west to guard against the Soviet threat is no longer an adequate justification for the
GATT. See id.
32. See generally JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
(1969) (compiling GATT laws and negotiations).
33. See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. l(a),
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA,
FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 23, 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1154 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter GATT 1994]. The result of the Uruguay Round was the GATT 1994. See id.
34. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
199,200 (1987).
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impossible. 5 America's other trading partners, however, knew that if
the Uruguay Round was not successfully completed, a protectionist
trade policy in the United States would result. Ultimately, the nations
struck a last minute deal, and the international trading regime was
expanded and strengthened.
The most comprehensive trade agreement to date, the Uruguay
Round not only freed up a number of markets, but also created the
WTO.36 President Clinton inherited this legacy of free trade and his
administration has sought to open markets abroad in a similarly mul-
tilateral fashion.
B. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
The United States, along with other trading states, has long sought
an effective, rules-based system for dealing with trade conflicts.
7
Historically, the United States invoked the GATT dispute settlement
procedures to challenge alleged wrongful trading policies more fre-
quently than any other country.38 The pre-Uruguay Round GATT
35. See Unraveling: Uruguay Round, ECONOMIST, Dec. 26, 1992, at 91 (noting
that as the seventh year of GATT talks commenced, France had already begun
proposing a number of amendments to the GATT text); see also King Peter,
ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at 78 (discussing the difficult task of negotiating the
GATT, and noting French resistance to reducing subsidized farm exports).
36. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15.
1994, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 9, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143 (1994).
37. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 283
(1992). Establishing a system with "teeth" does not mean using force in trade dis-
putes. Force is not an option, according to Fukuyama: "The industrial democracies
are today effectively linked in a web of binding legal agreements which regulate
their mutual economic interactions. While they may engage in political struggles
over beef quotas.., the use of force to settle such disputes among the democracies
themselves is totally unthinkable." Id.
38. See David A. Gantz, U.S., Europe Most Active in Trade Court, ARIZ. BUS.
GAZETTE, Feb. 19, 1998, at 4 (stating that the United States is the most frequent
plaintiff of the WTO members). Article 23 of GATT 1947 provided for consulta-
tion between Contracting Parties in any dispute. See GATT 1947, supra note 28,
art. 23. If this step yielded no settlement, the parties in conflict could refer the dis-
pute to the GATT Contracting Parties. Under Article 23(2), the Contracting Parties
would act jointly in investigating the matter, making recommendations, and ruling
on the dispute. See id. art. 23(2). If the Contracting Parties ruled in favor of the
complainant, they could authorize retaliation. Retaliation meant the suspension of
the application of some of the concessions or obligations the complainant had
[14:957
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dispute resolution mechanisms proved unproductive and inefficient,
angering the world's largest economy and leader of the free world."'
When a GATT Panel found that a government's complaint of an al-
leged GATT violation was justifiable, the defending country could
indefinitely block adoption of the Panel's report, leaving the matter
unresolved.' ° In essence, this consensus-driven process allowed a
Contracting Party to veto a GATT panel report with which it dis-
agreed, including a panel report against the Contracting Party itself.'
When a new round of GATT negotiations began, it was no sur-
prise that American lawmakers made their objectives clear: "Con-
gress made the negotiation of a more effective GATT dispute settle-
ment system a principal United States negotiating objective in the
Uruguay Round.' 2 Thus, a major part of the new WTO system is its
dispute settlement mechanism.3
against the violating Contracting Party. See id.
39. See Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Be-
tiveen Governments: A Comparison of the International Tar and Trade Regimes,
23 YALE J. INT'L L. 79, 82 (1998) (commenting that the pre-Uruguay Round
GATT "contained only a skeletal dispute settlement procedure").
40. See Robert E. Hudec, GAT Dispute Settlement After the Tok-1o Round: An
Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 173 (1980) (noting that if a de-
fending government did not agree with the complaint, the complaining government
could encounter going forward with the complaint); see also Phillip R. Trimble,
International Trade and the "Rule of Law " 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1037 (1985)
(stating that the implementation of the recommendations of the GATT Council is
based on the "engagement of regular national political processes").
41. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 345-57 (2d. ed. 1989) (dis-
cussing Article 23 of the GATT and its weaknesses). In fact, authorization under
Article 23 of GATT 1947 was granted only once. See id. This allows a prevailing
party to suspend concessions owed to the party in violation of a GATT rule. See id.
The Netherlands was allowed to suspend concessions to the United State as a result
of American quotas on Dutch agricultural products. See id.
42. URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, H.R. Doc. No. 103-780, at 1008
(1994) [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND].
43. See generally Shell, supra note 7 (critiquing the normative approaches of
the WTO dispute resolution system); see also Thomas J. Dillon Jr., The World
Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
LAw 349, 375-392 (1995) (discussing dispute settlement procedures under the
WTO).
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Designed to be the cornerstone of the international trading regime
that emerged from the Cold War, the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing ("DSU") 44 ensures fairness, consistency, and compliance.
As such, the new dispute settlement process for complaints does not
require a vote of the Members of the WTO.45 The DSU provides for
the use of unilateral sanctions against a WTO Contracting Party who
refuses to cease an illegal trading action.46 The United States gov-
ernment, however, has demonstrated the importance it places on the
multilateral process by using the WTO dispute resolution process as
a first resort on a regular basis, instead of unilateral sanctions.
The Bananas Dispute with the European Union is a shining exam-
ple of the American government's commitment to the multilateral
trading system. Certain European Union countries provided their re-
spective ex-colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific with
preferential access for their banana exports." This unwieldy system,
made up of patchwork national policies, resulted in the discrimina-
tion against "dollar" bananas from Central America.48 The United
44. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 19, para. 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 353, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
45. See URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 42, at 1010-17 (discussing the dispute
settlement process). The DSU provides that a complaining party must first attempt
to reach a solution through consultation, conciliation, or mediation before request-
ing that the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") form a complaint panel. The panel,
if established, generally has six months from the time the panel is established to
prepare a report. If neither party wishes to appeal, the adjudication process is com-
plete. Alternatively, a disputing party may appeal the panel decision to a three-
person appellate panel that will review the legal issues in the panel report. If the
defending party does not conform to the prescribed action within a brief, stipulated
time frame, it faces the possibility that the DSB may authorize the complainant to
withdraw benefits or take retaliatory actions. See id.
46. See id. at 1017 (noting that the complaining government should "consider
trade in the relevant sector or agreement as well as broader economic considera-
tions").
47. See Expelled from Eden, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 35, 36 (comment-
ing that until this year, Europe thought that it would be able to retain banana pref-
erences as a "political and economic bulwark for its former colonies").
48. See Guy de Jonqui~res, Bananas Battle Goes to the Brink, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
11, 1998, at 6 (stating that although France and Britain gave preferential treatment
to their ex-colonies, other European Union countries allowed unrestricted trade).
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States government complained twice to the old GATT dispute panel,
to no avail 9
As the European Union neared completion of its internal market in
1993, it decided to amalgamate this patchwork of preferential import
schemes into one larger system called the European Union Banana
Regime.0 The European Union Banana Regime regulates imports in
two ways. It applies a tariff to imports from countries that were not
ex-colonies, and it allocates licenses for European preferential mar-
ketshare for imports from former colonial lands." This restrictive
trade regime costs European Union consumers almost two billion
dollars annually. 2
Instead of imposing unilateral sanctions, Ecuador-the world's
leading banana exporter-Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the
United States53 joined in 1996 to challenge the European Union Ba-
nana Regime in a procedure before the WTO.' According to the
WTO decision, the European Union Banana Regime was to cease by
the end of 1998." The European Union was either to comply with
this decision, or face the threat of legal trade retaliation by the United
States and Central American banana producers. Throughout 1998,
the United States disputed whether the European Union had suffi-
49. See id. (reporting that the European Union used the "'GATT's elastic proce-
dures" to deflect the earlier complaints).
50. See Expelled from Eden, supra note 47, at 36 (noting that the European
Union decided to combine the various systems of banana preferences into one,
rather than reform them individually).
51. See id. (discussing the two principal components of the Banana Regime).
52. See id. (noting the burden the Banana Regime placed on consumers).
53. See Guy de Jonqui~res, Trade Goes Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at
15 (commenting that while there is "something irresistibly comical" about the ba-
nana dispute, it has become the crucial test of international trade rules). It is inter-
esting to note that the United States is involved in a dispute with the European
Union over products that it does not even export. The United States claims, how-
ever, that the Banana Regime discriminates against American distributors of
cheaper Latin American fruit. See id.
54. See Banana Split, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1998, at 19 (describing the WTO's
role in the dispute over the Banana Regime as "the closest there is to a global eco-
nomic court").
55. See Expelledfiom Eden, supra note 47, at 36 (commenting that no one was
surprised that the Banana Regime was condemned).
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ciently modified the regime to comply with the WTO panel ruling. 6
The European Union claimed that it had, while the United States
maintained the opposite and threatened retaliation in the form of
unilateral sanctions under its Super 301 mechanism. 7 On November
10, 1998, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") pub-
lished a list of European products on which one hundred percent tar-
iffs would be imposed if the banana regime was not altered."
On January 14, 1999, the USTR notified the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Body ("DSB") that the United States intended to suspend
concessions on particular products totaling almost $520 million in
trade) 9 The United States government argued that its actions were in
accord with WTO procedures,60 and asserted the desire to negotiate a
solution through formal WTO mechanisms.6 The United States ap-
proach in this regard demonstrated the Clinton Administration's
strong belief in the multilateral trading system as well as the WTO
dispute settlement system.
The United States attempted to present its unilateral measures per
the DSU, but faced a number of procedural delays from other Con-
tracting Parties.62 The United States repeatedly requested an acceler-
56. See de Jonqui~res, supra note 53, at 15 (reporting the criticism that the
United States is rushing retaliation since the WTO has not yet ruled on the legality
of the European Union's revised regime).
57. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text (discussing the Super 301
mechanism); see also Guy de Jonqui~res, Nerves are Taut as Leaders Hint at an
European Union-US Trade War, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1998, at 3 (commenting that
Sir Leon Brittan, Europe's Trade Commissioner, tried unsuccessfully to dissuade
USTR Charlene Barshefsky from threatening sanctions to retaliate against the
European Union Banana Regime).
58. See Stephen Fidler & Neil Buckley, US Threatens 100% Tax on European
Union Exports in Banana Trade War, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1998, at I (including
cheese, clothing, cosmetics, electronic goods, paper, and wine among the products
threatened with tariffs).
59. Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States to Apply its
WTO Retaliatory Rights in Bananas Case, DOc. 99-01 (visited Jan. 23, 1999)
<http://wwv.ustr.gov/releases/1999/01/99-Ol.pdf> [hereinafter USTR Doc. 99-
01].
60. See id.
61. See id. (noting USTR Barshefsky's comment that "the purpose of the WTO
is to resolve disputes, not to engage in protracted legal battles").
62. See Frances Williams, US Postpones Sanctions on European Union over
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ated panel hearing on the issue, but faced European intransigence
from the outset. USTR Charlene Barshefsky wrote a letter to WTO
Director-General Renato Ruggiero, confirming that the United States
was prepared to ask the original WTO panel to decide whether the
new regime instituted by the European Union complied with its
original ruling.63 The European Union stated that it would only agree
to a renewed panel if the United States dropped its threat of sanctions
against European Union products. '
The European Union requested WTO arbitration to review the
sanctions proposed by the United States. Thus, in accordance with
WTO rules, the United States delayed tariff suspensions for thirty
days to give the WTO arbitrators time to complete their investiga-
tion.65 On March 2, 1999, the arbitrators requested further informa-
tion on the actual harm caused to American exports by the Banana
Regime.'
On March 3, 1999, the USTR announced that the United States
will begin imposing 100% duties on over $500 million of selected
products imported from the European Union."' The United States will
not begin collecting these higher duties until after final release of the
arbitrators' report, and then will do so only to the extent necessary to
Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at 4 (stating that after the European Union
asked for arbitration, the WTO suspended over five hundred million dollars in
United States trade sanctions until March 1999).
63. See Frances Williams, European Union and US Locked in Negotiations,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1998, at 7 (noting that the WTO panel review was condi-
tioned on the premise that it be completed in time to allow the United States to ad-
here to its established timetable for sanctions against the European Union).
64. See Neil Buckley, European Union Will Accept Peace Offer If US Drops
Threat, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at 4 (adding that the European Union planned
to launch a separate challenge to United States 301 legislation as a violation of
WTO rules).
65. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release 99-17,
United States Takes Customs Action on European Imports (visited Mar. 12, 1999)
<http://vwwv.ustr.gov.releases/1999/03/99-17.html>.
66. See id.
67. See id.; see also Guy de Jonqui~res & Nancy Dunne, A Partnership in
Peril, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at 19 (likening the United States and the European
Union to "a middle-aged couple frustrated by the trials of co-habitation" in light of
the bananas dispute).
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offset the harm to American interests as determined by the WTO.6" In
support of the United States' position, Special Trade Negotiator,
Ambassador Peter Scher stated:
[w]e do not take these steps lightly, and it is only after exhausting every
opportunity thus far to try to resolve this dispute that we have reached this
position. We must conclude that it is time for the EU to bear some of the
consequences for its complete disregard for its GATT and WTO obliga-
tions."
It is not just with respect to bananas that the United States is
showing more faith in the WTO's DSU. The United States often ap-
pears to favor the WTO for trade complaints, rather than imposing
unilateral sanctions. For example, at the height of the 1995 confron-
tation with Japan over access to American automobile parts, the
United States threatened to file a WTO case against Japan.70 Simi-
larly, in June 1996, a yearlong investigation into Japan's photo-
graphic goods industry showed that Fuji, Japan's largest film pro-
ducer, tightly controlled distribution. Because the Japanese
government was doing little to open domestic markets to foreign
filmmakers, the United States filed its complaint with the WTO. 71
While the United States lost in that case,72 it argued and won a case
before the WTO challenging Canadian legislation protecting cultural
68. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release 99-17,
United States Takes Customs Action on European Imports (visited Mar. 12, 1999)
<http://www.ustr.gov.releases/1999/03/99-17.html>.
69. Id.; see also de Jonqui&es & Dunne, supra note 67, at 19 (considering the
positions of the United States and the European Union in the bananas dispute and
asserting that the conflict is putting global trade order at risk). Republican Con-
gressman Jim Kolbe, responding to the United States decision to impose sanctions
stated, "[i]f the EU won't abide by WTO decisions on bananas, how will we ever
get them to agree to anything else down the road?" See de Jonqui~res & Dunne,
supra note 67, at 19.
70. See Peter Morton, World Trade in 1995: Much Ado About Nothing, FIN.
POST, Dec. 23, 1995, at 51 (stating that the United States and Japan finally "ham-
mered out" a deal to increase American car imports into Japan).
71. See War Cancelled, ECONOMIST, June 28, 1996, at 72 (commenting that the
United States' choice not to impose unilateral sanctions signals its unwillingness to
violate its international obligations).
72. See Marc Selinger, Japanese Limit Film Market, U.S. Says, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1998, at B7 (reporting that the United States continues to charge Japan
with limiting its film market, despite losing its claim at the WTO).
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industries-specifically a Canadian law limiting the use of magazine
split-print runs. 73 The United States government also won before a
WTO panel a case wherein the United States had claimed that Can-
ada's dairy programs are inconsistent with its WTO obligations."
Clearly, as the world's leading trading state, it is important to the
United States that the rule of law established by the new dispute
resolution system is respected. Recently, the United States govern-
ment announced its compliance with a WTO ruling against the
American ban on imported shrimp from countries whose fishing
fleets do not use turtle excluder devices in their shrimp nets.'4 The
United States fought long and hard for a dispute resolution system
that had form, function, and most importantly, measurable and en-
forceable results. The United States, therefore, increasingly turns to
the dispute resolution panels under the WTO to enforce international
trade treaties.
C. ENFORCING THE WTO REGIME AND OTHER MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS
Under the Clinton Administration, the American government has
renewed its focus on enforcement of international treaties to which
the United States is a party. In the first Clinton term, Stuart Eizenstat,
73. See Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada-Certain Measures Con-
cerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/IR, at 37-38 (June 30, 1997) (rec-
ommending that Canada bring the measures, found by the panel to be inconsistent
with its obligations, into conformity). See generally Oliver R. Goodenough, De-
fending the Iniaginaiy to the Death? Free Trade, National Identiy" and Canada s
Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 203 (1998) (examining the
treatment of culture under the NAFTA and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment); John A. Ragosta, The Cultural Industries Exeniption fron NAFTAI-Its Pa-
raneters, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 165 (1997) (discussing the cultural aspect of the
NAFTA from an American perspective).
74. See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Press Release: United States Wins 1TO
Case Challenging Canadian Dair3, Practices (Mar. 23, 1999), available in
<http:vww.ustr.gov/releases/1999/03/99-26.html>
75. See WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS5SiSR at 300 (May 15,
1998) (finding no justification for the measures in dispute); \\fTO Appellate Body
Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, at 76 para. 187(c) (Oct. 12, 1998) (upholding
the Panel's conclusions); see also Williams, supra note 63, at 7 (noting the United
States' willingness to comply with the WTO ruling).
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with the assistance of then-USTR Mickey Kantor, opened the Trade
Compliance Center. This institution is devoted to monitoring foreign
compliance with international trade agreements.76 Indeed, enforce-
ment is an essential component of international trade." Eizenstat tes-
tified before the Senate that "[t]o maintain the current bipartisan con-
sensus for free trade, we must effectively and visibly enforce our
trade laws and agreements. We must demonstrate to our workers that
we intend to enforce the market opening commitments foreign coun-
tries have made with us in bilateral and multilateral agreements.""
Increasingly, however, the Clinton Administration must convince
the American workforce and other free trade skeptics of the value of
free trade. There is growing suspicion about the domestic benefits of
free trade, and increasing pressure to ensure that American products
reach as many markets as possible. In his State of the Union Address
on January 19, 1999, President Clinton told the American people
that:
[w]e ought to tear down barriers, open markets, and expand trade. But at
the same time, we must ensure that ordinary citizens in all countries actu-
ally benefit from trade-a trade that promotes the dignity of work, the
rights of workers, and protects the environment. We must insist that inter-
national trade organizations be more open to public scrutiny, instead of
mysterious, secret things subject to wild criticism.7 9
To accomplish this goal, the United States government has taken
an aggressive leadership position concerning the liberalization of
trade in new areas, such as financial services, information technol-
ogy, and telecommunications. The United States continues to press
developing countries to make offers of reasonable market openings
as a condition of any agreement. Minimum standards for market ac-
76. See Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 4 (stressing the importance of
effective and visible enforcement of United States trade law).
77. See id. (proffering China's improved intellectual property rights enforce-
ment as an example of the effectiveness of American trade law enforcement ef-
forts).
78. Id. at 3-4.
79. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 78, 83-4 (Jan 19, 1999) [hereinafter State of the
Union Address].
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cess are the entrance fee for negotiations, since access to the United
States market is a highly sought after prize.
D. A NEW ROUND OF WTO NEGOTIATIONS?
In his State of the Union address in 1999, President Clinton called
for a new round of global trade talks." Furthermore, Vice President
Al Gore called for new trade talks, with radical liberalization in agri-
culture as the centerpiece of a future deal." For Eizenstat, new world
trade talks would be designed "to reassert United States leadership in
continuing to keep arteries of trade open and not succumbing to the
backlash arising from some of the negative forces of globalization."'
The very format of the future talks is up for grabs; however, Wash-
ington favors a more sectoral approach to global trade talks to avoid
delay in one area by lack of accord in another."'
Regardless of the format, Fast Track negotiating authority is a
critical element of the United States entering such negotiations. '
President Clinton pleaded with United States lawmakers to grant him
Fast Track authority during his State of the Union address. Asserting
80. See id. (encouraging export expansion in the services, manufacturing, and
farm products sectors); see also Deborah McGregor, Call for New Round of i11orld
Trade Talks at Top of Agenda, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at 4 (noting that a new
round of global trade talks are proposed to fight protectionism worldwide); Frances
Williams & Guy de Jonqui~res, Brittan Welcomes Clinton Call for Talks, FIN.
TIMES, May 20, 1998, at 6 (noting that Brittan has already called for a "Millen-
nium Round" of new trade negotiations); European Union to Push for Millennium
Trade Round, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at 6 (stating that the European Union
trade ministers announced the need for broad talks, although they failed to discuss
exactly what would be included); Frances Williams, Brussels Outlines its Agenda
for Global Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at 10: Brittan Seeks Backing
for Millennium Round, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at 8.
81. See Guy de Jonqui~res, US Call for Farm Trade Reform, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
30-31, 1999, at 4.
82. McGregor, supra note 80, at 4.
83. See id. (quoting Eizenstat's comment that the United States will encourage
trading partners to break off "pockets" of agreement, rather than piecing them all
together into one universal deal); Williams, supra note 80, at 10 (stating that Euro-
pean Union and Japanese resistance to agricultural trade liberalization held up the
Uruguay Round).
84. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Polic,
18 BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 143, 143 (1992) (discussing the United States' use of Fast
Track procedure in trade policy).
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the need for "a new consensus on trade," the President called for Fast
Track authority, characterizing it as both "overdue and necessary. '
Approaching international trade policy in a multilateral fashion is
indeed a worthy geopolitical strategy. As Eizenstat stated, the United
States must strengthen its economic partnerships by opening mar-
kets, reducing barriers to American goods and services, and encour-
aging international economic behavior based on United States values
and ideals.86
Breaking open traditionally protectionist economies does more
than provide business opportunities for American firms: it locks in
the free market as a fundamental institution throughout the world.
Multilateralism is truly a post-World War II phenomenon, and an
arena in which the United States has come to excel. Moreover, the
United States is unlike other major Western trading states in that
American dominance is not the result of new trade thinking or neo-
colonial trading preferences:
In Britain and France, pressure politics and party politics since World
War II have structured the chief components of the trade debate-the allo-
cation of subsidies. Only in the case of the United States does trade poli-
cymaking remain closely tied to the international multilateral trading re-. 87
gime.
The century that is quickly closing can actually be termed an
American half-century. International trade issues continue to assume
greater importance in the United States. Trade has never been more
important to the national well-being of the United States than it is to-
day. More than eleven million people owe their jobs to foreign sales
of American-made products.88 Additionally, trade accounts for over
twenty-five percent of total gross domestic product. 9 The dominion
that the United States created is truly the result of the multilateral
85. State of the Union Address, supra note 79.
86. See Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 2.
87. VERDIER, supra note 31, at 288.
88. See Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 2 (characterizing the Clinton
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trading regime that followed the end of the Second World War.
Among the other pillars of financial architecture that emerged from
the Bretton Woods conference, the United States has pursued trade
policy with the spirit of multilateralism.
II. REGIONALISM: A POST-MODERN APPROACH
TO UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY
On May 1, 1997, Undersecretary Eizenstat told the United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:
[T]he United States must continue to lead in opening up the arteries of
trade in the international trading system... Our continuing leadership in
opening markets is essential to enhancing the prosperity and security of
the American people in the 21' century and binding the peoples of the
world together in a chain of prosperity and shared interests.
This statement correctly defines the Clinton Administration's trade
policy: hyper-regionalism.
This new hyper-regionalism has played a large role in United
States trade policy. As the European Union and Japan move towards
consolidating their respective trading power bases," the United
States appears to be fervently carving out new regional trading blocs.
Since 1993, the Clinton Administration has aggressively entered
America in a host of regional trade agreements. Building on the suc-
90. Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 2.
91. See Are Regional Trade Agreements A Good Idea?: Alphaghetti Spaghetti,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 21 (suggesting that proliferation of regional pacts
may in fact be counterproductive to the development of any one pact individually).
Jagdish Bhagwati has referred to regional trade areas as "stumbling blocks," rather
than "building blocks" in the liberalization of global trade. See id: see also Jagdish
Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
219, 227-34 (1993) (discussing past and current changes to the free trade system);
Spoiling World Trade, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1996, at 15 (discussing potential
problems with the cumulative effect of multiple trade agreements). The prolifera-
tion of regional trade agreements, liberalizing trade among members, means that
"the WTO is but one cook among many stirring the free-trade broth." Id.; see also
Nancy Dunne, WTO Chiefs Warning on Trade Groups, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1998,
at 6 (noting that trade regionalism can impede efforts to liberalize trade at the
global level). Renato Ruggiero, WTO Director-General, has warned against the
proliferation of regional trade agreements, stating that they must not become an
alternative to the multilateral system. See id.
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cess of the NAFTA, the United States intends to expand American
trade to the rest of Latin America, through the FTAA.9' In the Pacific
Rim, the United States led efforts to increase the role of APEC as a
legitimate trading bloc. In the wake of the economic turmoil that has
ravaged Asia, there is now momentum to engage Europe in a trans-
atlantic trading bloc.93 In short, it appears that the United States is ea-
ger to secure its primacy in regional trading arrangements around the
world.
A. BUILDING ON THE "SUCCESSES" OF NAFTA: Is CHILE NEXT?
For the United States, the NAFTA first manifested the spirit of re-
gionalism. A watershed in Pan-American trade, the NAFTA was de-
signed to increase trade, investment, and economic activities among
the three member countries-Canada, Mexico, and the United
States.94 The Clinton Administration convinced the American public
of the need for the NAFTA by arguing that the creation of a free
trade area was in the best interest of United States' security.
Despite ratification by Congress, the NAFTA appeared to be on
the defensive from the start. On the day it was to enter into force, the
Zapatista guerrilla campaign in Chiapas began.95 The Mexican peso
crisis followed later that year.96 The United States government put
together a $20 billion aid package both to save Mexico from finan-
cial collapse and, in the process, to save Texas and California from a
92. See Editorial, The Importance of Chile, J. CoM., Feb. 26, 1997, at 6A (re-
porting Clinton's view that Chile's accession to the NAFTA is the first big step
towards a FTAA).
93. See Guy de Jonqui~res, US and European Union Consider New Trade
Deal, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, at Al (stating that the United States considers
Europe a more stable export market).
94. See Editorial, At the End of the Rainbow, IND. STAR, Feb. 2, 1999, at A6
(commenting on the purposes of the NAFTA).
95. See Linda Diebal, Mexico's Most Wanted Man Speaks Out About His War,
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 9, 1994, at Al (reporting that the Zapatista campaign began
on January 1, 1994).
96. See James F. Smith, Free-Trade Treaty Sought By Mexico, E.U., L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at Al (detailing Mexico's eventual recovery from the 1994
peso crisis).
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deluge of illegal immigrants. This monetary infusion ensured the vi-
ability of the newest market for American-made consumer goodsi'
Despite this early success, the NAFTA came under fire from both
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans in Congress shortly
after coming into force.9 The former group sees the NAFTA and
other trade agreements with Latin America as attempts by United
States companies to flout labor and environmental standards.' Con-
servatives make strange bedfellows,'O concerned with certain re-
gimes' human rights records and the "giant sucking sound" of jobs
going south."' Some free trade advocates view the trade diversion
97. See Finlay Lewis, US., Mexico Strike Deal, $20 Billion in Aid Swapped for
Belt-Tightening Vows, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 25, 1995, at Al (stating that
the RMF supplied an additional $30 billion in economic aid to the ailing country);
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute
Conference: NAFTA Revisited: Seeing NAFTA Through Three Lenses, 23 CAN-
U.S. L.J. 73, 81 (1997) (describing the severity of the Mexican recession and ex-
plaining Mexico's relatively rapid recovery). In January 1997, Mexico finished re-
paying its entire peso-bailout debt. See id.
98. See Address by President William Jefferson Clinton to the People of Mex-
ico in Mexico City, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 666, 667 (May 7, 1997).
"Many people in both our countries painted a dark picture of lost jobs and boarded-
up factories should NAFTA prevail. Well, they were wrong. NAFTA is working--
working for you and working for the American people." Id.; see also BUCHANAN,
supra note 30, at 74.
NAFTA with Mexico means the gradual merger of the two economics. Eventually
there must come a demand for open borders and a single currency. Make no mistake.
We are in the betrothal stage of a courtship at the end of which comes a union of
America and Mexico-and that is the end of the nation we grew up in.
BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 74 (alleging that America will soon face the same
difficulties now faced by the nations of Europe). See generally DONALD L.
BARLET- & JAMEs B. STEELE, AMERICA: WHO STOLE THE DREAM? (1996).
99. See Editorial, supra note 92, at 6A (stating that Democrats want environ-
mental and labor standards written into any further free trade agreements).
100. See BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 107.
Like a shipwrecked, exhausted Gulliver on the beach of Lilliput, America is to be tied
down with threads, strand by strand, until it cannot move when it awakens. 'Piece by
piece,' our sovereignty is being surrendered. By accession to NAFTA, GATT, the UN,
the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, America has ensnared itself in a web that restricts
its freedom of action, diminishes its liberty, and siphons off its wealth.
Id.
101. See Editorial, No Sucking Sound, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 20, 1996, at A46
(arguing that the NAFTA has had neither a significantly positive, nor a signifi-
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that occurs with regional pacts like the NAFTA as an obstacle to ef-
ficiency."2 Other critics point to the financial instability that follows
the United States' close ties to a Latin American economy.
After the NAFTA, the collapse of the Mexican peso put more than
just the Mexican economy at risk.' 3 Classic protectionists and eco-
nomic nationalists alike question whether being stung once by the in-
stability of a Latin American country should not prevent further for-
ays into the region."" Notwithstanding these criticisms, President
Clinton proclaims the NAFTA a success, declaring that both the
United States and Mexico benefit from the agreement. 5
There is some rhetoric directed towards expanding the NAFTA to
include other Latin American countries. USTR Barshefsky acknowl-
edged the spirit of regionalism when she stated that "Chile is the first
cantly negative effect on the American economy).
102. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner gen. eds., 1976);
DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Ed-
ward C.K. Gonner ed., 1966); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE:
CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1990). Trade pacts can
sometimes cause neighbors to trade with one another when it would be more effi-
cient for them to export to, and import from, more distant countries. On the other
hand, while the United States is Mexico's largest trading partner, the inverse is not
the case for the United States, or Canada for that matter, notwithstanding the exis-
tence of the NAFTA. This so-called called trade diversion is a phenomenon that
can distort traditional efficiencies brought about by comparative advantage. See
generally SMITH, supra; RICARDO, supra; PORTER, supra. But see Robert W. Ben-
son, Free Trade As an Extremist Ideology: The Case of NAFTA, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 555, 557-78 (1994) (critiquing Smith and Ricardo's arguments).
103. See James F. Smith, Mexico Maintains Even Keel Despite Brazilian Storm,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at CI (reporting that Mexico's 1994 peso crisis rippled
through markets elsewhere).
104. See Geoff Dyer, Washington on Red Alert over Brazil, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
29, 1998, at 10 (suggesting that the economic fragility of Latin America in the
wake of Brazil's financial crisis does nothing to encourage further trade integration
between the two regions).
105. See Remarks Prior to Discussions with President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico
and an Exchange with Reporters, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 1801, 1803 (Nov.
14, 1997). See generally Michelle A. Kaiser, The Impact of NAFTA on the United
States Computer Industry: Why Trade Reforms Will Spark Increased Exports to
Mexico, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER L. 467 (1993) (applauding the opportunity
that the NAFTA provides for the United States, Canada, and Mexico to compete
successfully in the global economy).
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step."' 6 President Clinton confirmed this view during the 1994
Summit of the Americas, where he announced support for expansion
of the NAFTA, with Chile as the next state invited to enter the
agreement.0 7 Chile could accede either through the NAFTA or
through a bilateral agreement.' O' Notably, "[a]ccession to NAFTA by
any country or bloc will not occur without the political will of the
United States, NAFTA's most powerful member."'9 With new eco-
nomic nationalism in the United States, Congress has some cause for
concern and has delayed bringing Chile into the NAFTA, or even
into a bilateral trade pact. Moreover, the United States Congress has
been reluctant to provide President Clinton with Fast Track authority
to negotiate any trade deals." '
106. Trade Priorities in the Clinton Administration: Hearings Before the Comm.
On Int 7 Relations, 105th Cong. 10 (1997) [hereinafter Trade Priorities] (statement
of USTR Charlene Barshefsky).
107. See David E. Sanger, Chile is Admitted a North American Free Trade
Partner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at A8 (commenting that admitting Chile to
the NAFTA should pressure other South and Central American countries to open
their markets and expand trade with the United States); see also Frank J. Garcia,
NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA.
J. INT'L L. 539, 549 (1995) (noting that piecemeal accession is an appropriate step
for Latin American countries, such as Chile, to take). See generally Rafael X. Zah-
ralldin-Aravena, Chilean Accession to NAFTA: U.S. Failure and Chilean Success,
23 N.C. J. INT'L LAW & COM. REG. 53 (1997) (examining the issues surrounding
Chile's entry into the NAFTA). But see Brandy A. Bayer, Erpansion of NAFTA:
Issues and Obstacles Regarding Accession by Latin American States and Associa-
tions, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 615, 634 (1997) (reporting that "since 1994, the
enthusiasm by the United States for expansion of NAFTA has waned considera-
bly").
108. See David Gilmore, Expanding NAFTA to Include All of the Western Hemi-
sphere: Making Chile the Next Member, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 413, 413 (1994)
(advocating Chilean accession into the NAFTA).
109. Bayer, supra note 107, at 634.
110. See Chile is not in Rush to Join NAFTA Foreign Afinister Says, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) D-6 (Jan. 17, 1997). In the meantime, Chile has signed pacts with
Canada, Mexico, and the Mercado Comin del Sur ("Mercosur"), a common mar-
ket project that includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. See id.; see
also David A. Gantz, The United States and the Erpansion of Western Hemisphere
Free Trade: Participant or Observer, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 381, 400
(1997) (discussing Chile's agreements with Mercosur and Canada). Chilean acces-
sion to the NAFTA may be hindered by Chile's free trade agreement with Merco-
sur. Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, Potential Conflict Areas in an)y Future Negotiations
Between Mercosur and the NAFTA to Create a Free Trade Area of the Americas,
983
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Despite the inability to win Fast Track negotiating authority from
Congress, President Clinton is still pushing ahead with negotiations.
During his visit to Santiago, he asked the Chilean people to "be pa-
tient with [the United States].""' Furthermore, the President noted
that the United States would launch the FTAA talks even in the ab-
sence of Fast Track authority."2
Despite this rising protectionist sentiment in the United States,
there remains a feeling that it may be better to participate in the
world trade forum from a position of greater regional solidarity.
Even protectionists agree. Pat Buchanan remarked: "Rather than
global free trade, the United States should promote regional trading
zones .... Nations inside these blocs are far more compatible than,
say, America and China.... A regional trading bloc is more natural
and organic than a global regime, and nations within these zones are
in similar stages of development.""' 3
Moreover, some in the Clinton Administration see the WTO as an
increasingly unmanageable forum for trade regulation and interna-
tional agreements. It is not surprising then that United States trade
policy focuses on regional agreements like the FTAA. Particularly in
the Latin American region, the United States has both the spirit and
the extended history of regionalism.
14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 305 (1997). The Chilean government maintains
that it will not negotiate with the United States unless the President secures Fast
Track authority. See id.
111. Remarks to Businesses and Community Leaders in Santiago, 34 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 658, 659 (Apr. 16, 1998).
112. See id. Some analysts believe that even if the United States Congress
passes Fast Track legislation to negotiate with Chile, it will be insufficient for the
United States government to move toward obtaining a FTAA. See Proceedings of
the Canada-United States Law Institute: NAFTA Revisited: Discussion After the
Speeches of M. Jean Anderson and Richard Dearden, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 243, 246
(1997) (statement of M. Jean Anderson) (stating that Fast Track authority to nego-
tiate with Chile is not sufficient to allow negotiation of a FTAA).
113. BUCHANAN, supra note 30, at 284 (characterizing countries in the same re-
gion as sharing geography, economic and social systems, history, and culture).
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B. NEW DOMINIONS: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
The United States exports more to the Western Hemisphere than to
any other region of the world."' Latin America is a very important
market for the United States and promises to grow even more so in
the future. Notably, forty-five percent of American exports are to
FTAA countries, and exports to Latin America have nearly doubled
in the past five years."5
Given this, it is not surprising that the Clinton Administration, like
the Bush Administration before it, believes that a Pan-American free
trade pact to create one market from Alaska to the Tierra del Fuego
is necessary and appropriate."16 The cornerstone of United States for-
eign policy for Latin America is geared towards continued economic
integration through implementation of the FTAA."7 Such a conti-
nental trade pact will account for fifty-two percent of all international
trade. In a world where the Japanese and Europeans are quickly
overtaking United States competitive positions in trade, there may be
114. See Sidney Weintraub, US-Latin American Economic Relations, 39 J.
INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 59, 66 (1997).
115. See Peter Costatini, Trade-Outlook: NAFTA Slouches Toward FTAA, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 20, 1998, p. unavail. online (noting the importance of trade
between Latin America and the United States, but emphasizing that Washington's
"political paralysis on trade" may delay further trade integration). The European
Union's more moderate approach to economic integration makes it an attractive
trading partner for Latin America. See id.
116. See Gantz, supra note 110, at 395 (explaining how the NAFTA can be used
as a starting point for other hemispheric agreements). The author concludes that "it
is becoming increasingly evident that the NAFTA as presently structured is too
complex and ponderous an instrument to expand to a large group of additional
state parties." Id. at 401; see also Richard G. Dearden, Implications of NAFTA s
Extension to Chile and Other Countries-A Canadian View, 23 CAN.-U.S. Li.
235, 236-38 (1997) (commenting on Pan-American trade liberalization from the
Canadian perspective and recognizing the need for trade rules that can govern
countries that may not know the rule of law); Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-
Building For Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900,
943-46 (1997) (observing that the successful negotiation of a FTAA depends on a
confluence of interests among the countries who will be parties to the agreement);
Carol Stump, Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 153,
170 (1995) (stating that the FTAA is to be a compilation of preexisting regional,
bilateral, and multilateral trade agreements).
117. See Miguel Otero-Lathrop, Mercosur And NAFTA: The Need for Conver-
gance, 4 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 116, 119 (1998).
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more control, and hence opportunity to remain a hegemonic power in
one's own hemisphere.'
It took time for the idea of a Pan-American free trade pact to be
taken seriously. " 9 Since the Alliance for Progress ran its course in the
1960s, the United States government has had no effective economic
policy in the region.12 American foreign policy developed in a Cold
War vacuum and focused on eliminating the Communist threat from
the hemisphere. 2' Consequently, United States industries and service
providers were slow to understand the value of the Latin American
region as a market. With the implementation of the NAFTA, pro-
viding free trade with Canada and Mexico, the rest of Latin America
seems the next natural extension of United States trade policy.'22
Support for a regional free trade pact now exists in every country in
the Americas except for Cuba. This regional agreement will create a
free trade zone of nearly one billion consumers, with a gross domes-
tic product reaching at least $9 trillion by the year 2005.12'
118. Cf William C. Plouffe, Jr., Sovereignty in the "New World Order": The
Once and Future Position of the United States, a Merlinesque Task of Quasi-legal
Definition, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 49, 62 (citing FRANCES H. STEPHENS, WE
THE PEOPLE 43 (1997)) (characterizing the Monroe Doctrine as "a formal political
statement that the United States considers itself to be the primary influence within
the American continents"). The Monroe Doctrine stated that any threat to the secu-
rity of the Western Hemisphere was a threat to the United States. See Ediberto
Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42
VILL. L. REv. 1119, 1149 n.135 (citing JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 289 (1992)).
119. The Americas are such an emerging economic power that even The
Economist reorganized its magazine sections to reflect this recognition. See Redis-
covering the Americas, ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 15 (stating that the regular
section that was once called "American Survey" was renamed "United States,"
while a new section "The Americas" was created to cover Canada, the Caribbean,
and Latin America-areas formerly covered in the "International" section). It
would take a British publication to recognize the fact that the term "American"
means more than the United States. It would also take an insightful forward-
thinking periodical to trumpet the change.
120. See Weintraub, supra note 114, at 66.
121. See id. at 67.
122. See id. at 66.
123. See Second Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Santiago, Santiage de
Chile April 18-19, 1998 (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.summit-
americas.org/chiledc.htm> [hereinafter Declaration of Santiago] (explaining that
following the Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, the leaders of the thirty-
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The FTAA would do to Latin America what Simon Bolivar was
unable to do-unite the continent.2 Evidenced by the success of
Mercosur, 125 the participating countries have used liberal economics
to unite the region, instead of using the military. There has been a
significant paradigm shift throughout the continent: all countries of
the hemisphere, except for Cuba, have done away with their protec-
tionist past and have taken measures towards open markets as the
path towards sustained economic growth. Even the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the
philosophic parent of import substitution, began to advocate open
markets and freer regional trade.
It will take more than this, however, to get the negotiations mov-
ing. Certain Latin American countries have internal economic cir-
cumstances that prevent enthusiastic support for the hemispheric
trade agreement advocated by the United States. Notably, after
spending five years struggling and nearing economic stability,'2' Bra-
zil is currently reeling from its currency devaluation in mid-January
1999.127 As the Brazilian economy grew during the mid-1990s, the
country had to absorb the impact of a unilateral trade opening that
saw imports rise dramatically with a concurrent trade deficit deep-
ening. Consequently, although Brazil supports development of the
FTAA, the country's main priority continues to be the strengthening
and enlargement of its South American commercial links within
six states continued to press for negotiations to conclude by 2005).
124. See Ruperto Patino Manffer, The Future of Free Trade in the Imericas, 10
CONN. J. INT'L. L. 639, 640 (1995) (recognizing that the FTAA is an important
step toward economic integration and "toward the birth of an American Union").
125. Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing A Common Mar-
ket, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Mercosur Treaty]. Formed in 1991,
Mercosur boasts a combined gross domestic product GDP of one trillion dollars,
and a population of two hundred million spread over twelve million square kilo-
meters. See Ana Maria De Aguinis, Can Mercosur Accede to NAFT4? A Legal
Perspective, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 597, 598 (1995).
126. See Storm Clouds From Brazil, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1997, at 17.
127. Id. (stating that the country's S10 billion trade surplus in 1994 quickly dete-
riorated into a S5.5 billion deficit in 1996). The deficit continued to grow as the
Brazilian currency remained artificially pegged against the American dollar, this
changed on January 13, 1999, when the real was allowed to float freely. See Still a
Big Risk, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1999, at 16 (asserting that a floating currency may
exacerbate Brazilian economic problems).
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Mercosur. Brazil and its Mercosur partners want more time to be-
come competitive before trade barriers fall."2 8 As a result, Mercosur
prefers three stages of negotiations on the FTAA, starting with
"business facilitation" issues, like better customs procedures, and
moving on to tariff-cutting matters only after 2003.129
The United States initially wanted to start the negotiations with
market-opening measures, evidencing the spirit of hyper-
regionalism. Notwithstanding the United States' approach, Mercosur
continues to balk at fast-paced negotiations. In so doing, the South-
ern Cone is proving that it is a real competitor to the United States in
uniting the Americas.'" Initially, only the four original Mercosur
members made up the Southern Cone. Chile, Latin America's fastest
growing economy, joined as an associate member in October 1996; "1
Bolivia has signed a commercial accord. In mid-September 1996, the
five members of the Andean Community announced their intention
to follow suit. 3 ' Mercosur has signed its own trade agreement with
the European Union. " Even Canada indicated that it wanted to start
"conversations" on some kind of free trade deal with Mercosur. 1 4
128. See Bayer, supra note 107, at 635 (explaining Brazil's plan to expand Mer-
cosur into an organization with the ability to negotiate with the NAFTA as an
equal).
129. See Stump, supra note 116, at 156.
130. See The End of the Beginning, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at S3 (charac-
terizing the Southern Cone as an integrated, open, and growing market of almost
250 million people). Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uru-
guay form the Southern Cone. See id.; see also The Race to Bridge Borders,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at S18.
131. See Chile's MERCOSUR Membership Takes Effect, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1576 (Oct. 9, 1996).
132. See Chile Joins Southern Cone Common Market as Andean Nations Agree
to Multilateral Free-Trade Negotiations with MERCOSUR, NOTISUR-LATIN AM.
POL. AFF., Oct. 4, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Latnews Database, 1996 WL
8089443. The members of the Andean Community are Bolivia, Columbia, Ecua-
dor, Peru, and Venezuela. See id.
133. See European Union Foreign Ministers Endorse Latin American Agree-
ments, EUR. REP., Dec. 6, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 13285591
(stating that European Union foreign ministers agreed to guidelines for a Free
Trade Agreement with Mercosur). The countries set a timetable for liberalization
talks. See id.
134. See Dearden, supra note 116, at 237.
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It is clear that the interests of the United States and the leading
trading states, Brazil and Argentina, that make up the Southern Cone
trading bloc are different. The United States worries that Mercosur
poses a potential protectionist obstacle and may become a strong
competitor to uniting the Americas under a free trade pact. Latin
American countries, on the other hand, fear that open commercial
competition with the United States could harm their newly liberal-
ized economies. These burgeoning economies have only recently
beaten down inflation and begun to privatize traditionally state-run
industries protected from external competition.
In the Joint Ministerial Declaration of Belo Horizonte, ministers
from thirty-four FTAA signatory countries agreed to launch formal
hemispheric free trade talks in March 1998.' The thirty-four states
agreed upon the entire negotiating structure-from 1999 to 2005-as
well as the following issues: The decision-making process will be
based on consensus; any agreement will be compatible with the rules
of the WTO in Geneva; countries may negotiate and join the FTAA
individually or as members of a group; and special attention should
be given to the needs, economic conditions, and opportunities of the
smaller economies to ensure their full participation in the FTAA pro-
cess. 36 The April 1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago furthered
this work and talks have begun in earnest."'
Once considered merely a dream, the FTAA may soon become a
reality. FTAA supporters now speak of the agreement's "increasing
irreversibility." "There will be a free trade area of the Americas,"
proclaimed the USTR in the true spirit of regionalism, before her de-
parture for the Second Summit of the Americas."'
135. See Michael Christie, Brazil Says Progress Made on Americas Free Trade,
REUTER EUR. UNION COMMUNITY REP'T, May 15, 1997, p. unavail. online. Belo
Horizonte is the Brazilian city where the FTAA talks took place on May 16 and 17,
1997.
136. See Frank J. Garcia, Decisioninaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free
Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L.
357, 359 (1997) (examining the theoretical and structural issues still to be resolved
for the creation of the FTAA's governing institutions).
137. See Declaration of Santiago, supra note 123; Second Summit of the
Americas, Plan of Action (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.summit-
americas.org/chileplan.htm>.
138. See Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Press Briefing by National
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Many options remain to secure the FTAA given the number of re-
gional trading blocs existing in the Americas.' " In addition to the
NAFTA and Mercosur, the region is home to the Caribbean Com-
mon Market, 41 the Latin America Integration Association, 41 the An-
dean Common Market,42 and the Central American Common Mar-
ket,14'3 a free trade zone. Will the FTAA be an extension of the
NAFTA'" or a brand new framework encompassing all the constitu-
ent blocs in a super bloc? 45 According to Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright these details can be worked out over time:
Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Special Envoy for the Americas Mack McLarty
United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Apr. 13, 1998 (visited
Feb. 7, 1999) <www.pub.whitehouse.gov>.
139. See Garcia, supra note 136, at 358 (noting that institutional development is
one of the most challenging issues facing the FTAA supporters).
140. The Caribbean Common Market was created through an Annex to the
Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, B.D.I.E.L. 647. Car-
ibbean Common Market members include Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guy-
ana, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad. See id.
141. See Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration As-
sociation, Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (1980). Latin American Integration Asso-
ciation members include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
142. See Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Bol.-
Colom.-Chile-Ecuador-Peru, 8 I.L.M. 910 (explaining that Venezuela participated
but did not initially sign the agreement). Chile later denounced the Andean Com-
mon Market. See GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, Jan. 1, 1974, I.A.T.C. 360 (1985).
143. See General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13,
1960, El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., 455 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 4,
1961). Costa Rica later acceded to the Central American Common Market. See
GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Nov. 9,
1963, I.A.T.C. 417 (1985).
144. See Bayer, supra note 107, at 624 (noting that "the text of NAFTA allows
for the possibility of accession"); see also Robert F. Housman, Symposium:
NAFTA at Age One: A Bheprint for Hemispheric Integration? L The Environment
Side Agreement: The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future
Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization Efforts, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 301, 321-
23 (examining the pros and cons of the "NAFTA Plus" accession approach); Sec-
retary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Advancing Hemispheric Cooperation: The
Summit of the Americas, DIARIO LAS AMERICAS, Apr. 5, 1998, at 5-A (asserting
that the FTAA will go beyond the agreements already in place).
145. See Sam Laird, Latin American Trade Liberalization, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 195, 215-16 (1995) (exploring the evolution of Latin American trade pol-
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The hemispheric community is committed to creating the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. FTAA would be step beyond agree-
ments already in place, such as NAFTA and the Central American Com-
mon Market. FTAA, coupled with the regional pacts and rooted in liberal
market reforms, would not only expand economic integration, but also
create jobs and raise living standards by removing barriers to investment
and trade within the Western Hemisphere. "
Even with the pan-Hemispheric spirit supporting the FTAA, poli-
cymakers and analysts must navigate through the myriad of compli-
cated issues of power, sovereignty, subsidiarity, and the relative de-
cline of the nation-state in this negotiating process.'4 ' It is for all
those reasons that the United States must define its future leadership
role. The United States government must capitalize on the Latin
American states' commitments to open regionalism and ensure that
their economies do not move back towards import substitution. Be-
cause many of the sub-regional groups of Latin America currently
exclude the United States, the Clinton Administration must take all
necessary steps to ensure the United States leads the process and the
prosperity of the entire hemisphere. 141
C. INCREASING THE ROLE OF APEC
Through much of the Cold War, the United States focused its at-
tention on Europe. Today, the focus is on Asia and the Pacific. The
Pacific Rim has long been viewed as the source for future gains in
international trade. According to Raj Bhala, "already we are living in
146. Albright, supra note 144, at 5A.
147. See Stephen Zamora, Allocating Legislative Competence in the Americas:
The Early Experience under NAFTA and the Challenge of Hemispheric Integra-
tion, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 615, 619 (1997). "If we do achieve a Free Trade Agree-
ment for the Americas, with a much greater degree of economic and social inte-
gration, it will be even more difficult to separate local concerns from national
concerns, and national concerns from international concerns." Id.
148. See Gantz, supra note 110, at 410 (asserting that "the U.S. faces the loss of
a once-in-a-generation opportunity to influence the shape of Western Hemisphere
economic integration in a manner that broadly benefits and protects U.S. inter-
ests"); see also Shirley Christian, Latin American Trade Relations, 39 J.
INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 71 (1996) (describing how the United
States either must deal with Latin America on an equal basis or see the region
move forward on its own).
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the 'Pacific Century."",149 The Asian region is home to large and
growing markets, but also to countries with relatively high trade bar-
riers. An emerging trading bloc in the Pacific Rim, APEC is heralded
to portend future prosperity for all members, including the United
States.'"0 United States leadership in APEC and other emerging in-
stitutions in the Pacific Rim is a hedge for the future of the region
and United States hegemony in it.
Taking their lesson from the European Union, APEC members
initially wanted to avoid the costs and bureaucracy that come with
Brussels-like machinery. APEC's main preoccupation was to take
the lead in global liberalization, and in doing so, its trade ministers
developed a joint offer in late 1993 that assisted in bringing the Uru-
guay Round to a successful conclusion."'' More recently, the Asia-
Pacific countries are moving to transform APEC from an informal
group to a regional organization that will sidestep the WTO and set
the agenda on opening global markets to goods and services. APEC
is committed to assuring non-members that it would not become a
discriminatory and protectionist trading bloc, thus countering in-
ward-looking regionalism everywhere-particularly in the trading
blocs of North America and Europe.
Since its establishment in 1989, APEC has become the primary
regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical economic
cooperation.'52 Part of the APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration
stated that "[w]e remain convinced that open markets bring signifi-
cant benefits and we will continue to pursue trade and investment
liberalization that fosters further growth."'53 Another of APEC's
149. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 35
(1996).
150. See Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference,
supra note 112, at 244 (comments of Rep. Cunningham) Some analysts believe
that the APEC is the first priority of the United States regional trade policy. See id.
These analysts assert that FTAA will languish as the United States pursues its
goals in the Pacific. See id.
151 See About APEC (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.apec.govt.nz/
aa/index.htm> (providing the history of APEC and remarking on its role in suc-
cessfully completing the Uruguay Round negotiations).
152. See id.
153. APEC Secretariat, APEC Economics Leaders' Declaration: Connecting the
APEC Community (Nov. 25, 1997), reprinted in APEC Leaders Meet in Vancou-
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goals is to advance Asia-Pacific economic dynamism and foster a
sense of community." The twenty-one APEC members, which in-
clude the United States and Canada, account for close to forty-seven
percent of the world's imports and more than forty-five percent of its
exports, the latter totaling $1.9 trillion annually.'55 With a combined
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") of over $16 trillion in 1995 and
forty-four percent of global trade, 56 APEC promises to be a power-
house regional bloc even in the midst of Asia's economic turmoil.
Currently, APEC is a less-visible, less-structured organization than
the WTO, and reaches non-binding decisions by consensus. Flexibil-
ity is a principle enshrined in the forum, but that may soon change.
Following a meeting in Montreal, on May 10, 1997, the members of
APEC agreed to eliminate global tariffs for as many as fifteen new
economic sectors, ranging from automobiles to environmental tech-
nology, chemicals to pulp and paper products.'5' Moreover, APEC
states have set two deadlines for free trade-2010 for the developed
countries and 2020 for developing states.'5'
The first area for new initiatives will be information technology.
APEC ministers stated that they favor expanding the range of prod-
ucts covered in a 1997 agreement by forty states representing ninety-
three percent of the $1 trillion world trade in computers and soft-
ware. 9 APEC plans to end tariffs on cash registers, photocopying,
and automated teller machines.'" APEC will then set its sights on the
liberalization of financial services so that banks and insurance com-
panies would be better able to compete globally.'1'
ver, Address Economic Crisis, Challenge of Globalization, 9 FOREIGN POL'Y
BULL., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 105, 105.
154. See id.
155. See No Action, No Agenda: Trade in the Pacific, ECONOMIST. Nov. 25,
1995, at 75.
156. See id.
157. See Laura Eggertson, APEC Takes on Key Trade Role, Asia-Pacific Na-
tions Agree to Move Quickly to Open Matters in up to 15 Economic Sectors,
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Initially, the United States government appeared not to take the
role of APEC in world trade very seriously. President Clinton can-
celed his attendance at an APEC summit meeting in Osaka in No-
vember 1995 at the last minute. Likewise, he failed to appear at the
Kuala Lumpur meeting in November 1998 because of the emerging
crisis with Iraq, but sent Vice President Gore in his place. 62
By putting more stock into the APEC framework, the Clinton
Administration can avoid criticism from Congress and right-wing
Republicans like Pat Buchanan for surrendering sovereignty to the
WTO. Because economic liberalization in the Asian region is occur-
ring on a voluntary basis, the United States has the opportunity to en-
sure that it actively guides the liberalization process to its advantage.
Moreover, agreements among APEC members to cut tariffs may be
used by the United States to negotiate lower trade barriers in other
regions like the European Union. Thus, by positioning APEC as the
apex of drafting trade deals, the Clinton Administration may avoid
some political heat.
The last APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, however, was
relatively unsuccessful as attempts to liberalize nine export sectors,
including forestry and fisheries, fell through in the wake of Japanese
resistance.' 61 United States negotiators joined other industrialized
countries in advocating these liberalization measures, to no avail.
Although the tariff reduction package was meant to be the center-
piece of the APEC summit, comments by Vice President Gore call-
ing for more democracy in Malaysia became the main story of the
summit. ' Diplomatic protests over American interference in Malay-
162. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Gore Shocks Malaysian Host, Backs Ouster
Call, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 17, 1998, at A12 (reporting that Vice Presi-
dent Gore traveled to the Osaka summit meeting in President Clinton's place).
163. See Peter Montagnon & Sheila McNulty, Attempts at APEC Deal Fail as
Japan Resists Tariff Cuts, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at 18.
164. See Lakshmanan, supra note 162, at Al. Vice President Gore told the lead-
ers of the assembled APEC members: "Democracies have done better in coping
with economic crisis than nations where freedom is suppressed ... we continue to
hear calls for democracy ... among the brave people of Malaysia." Id. at A 12.
Canada also became embroiled in the civic unrest surrounding the summit by call-
ing for greater human rights protection in Malaysia, much to the consternation of
Dr. Mahatir Mohammed's regime. See Peter Montagnon & Sheila McNulty, Can-
ada Takes Stand on Human Rights at APEC Summit, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at
3 (reporting the Canadian argument that "it is impossible to divorce trade liberali-
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sian domestic affairs followed, and the summit ended in a state of
disarray.
165
Despite this setback, the spirit of regionalism still pervades United
States policy in the Pacific Rim. The United States government must
remain vigilant as another main regional bloc, encompassing many
APEC members, expedites discussions towards trade liberalization
among themselves. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN") approved a broad set of proposals to open markets for
trade and investment among its nine members.' It is a race to the
finish line to determine which free trade deal can be completed first
and achieve the most trade liberalization. With the continued eco-
nomic turmoil in Asia and increased popular resistance against cer-
tain totalitarian governments, the outcome is uncertain. Nevertheless,
the United States government must continue to pursue its regional
policies actively.
D. THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE WITH THE EUROPEAN
UNION
In the wake of the international financial crisis, the traditional al-
lies now face new responsibilities. According to USTR Barshefsky,
the United States and the European Union must lead the effort to re-
solve the global financial turmoil. "The world is looking to us for
leadership and responsibility in ways neither the United States nor
Europe have seen for many years; perhaps not since the post-war
generation. And both of us must respond."''
The European Union and United States are mutually dependent-
their direct investments in each other's economies in 1997 exceeded
$750 billion.6 6 Next to the United States, the European Union is the
largest economy in the world. By the mid-1990s, more than half of
zation from other freedoms").
165. See Lakshmanan, supra note 162, at A12.
166. See Jonathan Birchall, ASEAN Seeks Speech' Trade Liberalisation, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at 6.
167. Testimony of Ambassador Charlene Barsheftk. U.S. Trade Representative,
Before the House Ways and Means Conn. on Trade Relations with the European
Union (visited Jan. 10, 1999) <http:/lwww.ustr.gov/testimony/barshefsky-2 l.pdf
[hereinafter Barshefsky Testimony].
168. See id.
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the United States' entire direct investment abroad was in Europe. 6 9 It
is also a major import market for United States products. United
States exports to the European Union were $141 billion in 1997 and
accounted for 1.3 million United States jobs that year."'
Clearly, the economic relationship between these traditional trad-
ing partners is important. According to USTR Barshefsky, "[t]he
partnership between Europe and the United States has been the bed-
rock of peace and prosperity for the last fifty years; and it can con-
tinue to play that role for the next century.""' In addition to the role
that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization played in maintaining
security in Europe, relations among these traditional allies have re-
sulted in scientific, technological, and other industrial breakthroughs.
In 1997, President Clinton identified the European Union as one of
the "most valued partners" of the United States for the twenty-first
century."2 Clinton was referring not only to the enormous size of the
trade and investment relationship-the biggest in the world-but
also to Europe's importance in helping the United States promote the
international economically liberalizing agenda of the United States.
Stuart Eizenstat testified before the Senate that specific economic
policy goals should be part of a new transatlantic agenda with
Europe; 173 one that is intended to foster even better trade relations
with Europe."74 Notably, the United States government is working
169. See In Need of Fastening U.S.-European Relations, ECONOMIST, May 27,
1995, at 15.
170. See Barshefsky Testimony, supra note 167.
171. America's Trade Agenda in Europe, Remarks of Ambassador Charlene
Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative, to the European Union Committee
of the American Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, Belgium, October 19, 1998
(visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.ustr.gov/testimony/barshefsky-21.pdf> (stat-
ing that the United States' "trade agenda with Europe is quite full").
172. See The President's News Conference with European Union Leaders in The
Hague, The Netherlands, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 782 (May 28, 1997)
[hereinafter President's News Conference in The Hague].
173. See Eizenstat, supra note 19; President's News Conference in The Hague,
supra note 172 (noting that the new transatlantic agenda was created in Madrid in
1995 to foster cooperation on a broad range of challenges common to both the
United States and Europe).
174. See President's News Conference in The Hague, supra note 172 (asserting
that the purpose of the transatlantic agenda is to bring down trade barriers, fight
international crime, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation).
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with the European Union to reduce barriers to transatlantic trade
through the negotiation of Mutual Recognition Agreements aimed at
reducing testing and certification costs of United States products.
Following the Asian financial crisis, both the United States and
European Union made some efforts to reduce further the barriers of
transatlantic trade and investment. In early 1998, both sides toyed
with the idea of free trade talks between the two traditional trading
partners. The United States and the European Union were to decide
by April 1998 where to open formal negotiations aimed at a broad
free trade agreement. 7' Dangers, however, exist in such a pact. Crit-
ics have warned that a regional pact combining the two most power-
ful economic powers in the world would lead to favoritism among
the most developed states by less developed countries. The European
Union itself is attempting to shore up new partners in its quest to be
the reigning regional economic power. To this end, the European
Union has entered into negotiations with a number of major trading
states and regions worldwide.'
7 6
175. See Guy de Jonqui~res, US and European Union Consider New Trade
Deal: Asian Crisis Has Helped Refocus Attention on Europe's Attractions, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1998, at Al.
176. See Mexico and European Union Start Talks on Free Trade Accord, FIN.
TIMES, July 15, 1998, at 6. (stating that an European Union-Mexico joint council
will meet annually to review progress on trade talks); Andrea Mandel-Campbell,
EU and Mexico hopeforfastestfree tradepact, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1999, at 8. It is
not surprising that Latin America finds trade relations with the European Union
more valuable than those with the United States. A study by the Getulio Vargas
Foundation, a Brazilian think tank, suggests that a free trade deal between Merco-
sur and the European Union would add more growth in both Brazil and Argentina
than would a FTAA. See The Americas: The Road Fron Santiago, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 11, 1998, at 25 (contemplating the impact of a free trade deal between Merco-
sur and the European Union). The European Union has long been Mercosur's big-
gest trading partner and in 1996, the European Union replaced the United States as
Mercosur's largest source of foreign investment. See INST. FOR EUROPEAN-LATIN
AM. RELATIONS, Doc. No. BRF-97/7-TRA, EUROPEAN UNION-LATIN AMERICAN
TRADE: AN UNEVEN RELATIONSHIP (1997); see also INST. FOR EUROPEAN-LATIN
AM. RELATIONS, Doc. No. BRF-88/7-TRD, TRADE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND LATIN AMERICA: RECENT TRENDS AND PENDING PROBLEMS (1998).
The European Union is also working towards a free trade relationship with South
Africa. See S. Africa Edges Towards European Union Pact, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1998, at 4. For three years, Pretoria and Brussels have pursued talks to open 90%
of the European Union-South African market in approximately ten years. See Guy
de Jonqui~res, European Union & S. Africa Close to Trade Deal, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1999, at 4; Neil Buckley, Hopes for S. Africa Trade Pact with European Un-
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Clearly, the spirit of regionalism is manifesting itself globally.'"
The Europeans are attempting to consolidate their trade relations
with individual Latin American states as well as with Mercosur.
Likewise, Japan's investment strategy targets Asian states as well as
Latin America. It is only natural for regionalism to be the dominant
policy orientation of the United States government in the trade arena.
The multiplicity of trade policies endorsed by American policymak-
ers demonstrates the multitude of benefits that come with such an
orientation. It also verifies that the United States is currently attend-
ing to many trading initiatives with zeal. With the momentum to-
wards a Pan-American free trade area, the APEC forum, and the
prospects of a new Transatlantic Marketplace, hyper-regionalism is
clearly the preferred strategy of the United States government. This
is clearly beneficial for trade worldwide and trade opportunities for
the United States in particular.
ion, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1998, at 7; Michael Smith, European Union Urges Final
Push for S. Africa Trade Deal, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at 4.
177. See Jeanette M.E. Tramhel, Free Trade in the Americas: A Perspective
fr'om the Organization of American States, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 595, 613 (1997)
(arguing that despite warnings by theorists and diplomats against hyper-
regionalism, such a proliferation of regional trading blocs can benefit overall ef-
forts towards global trade liberalization). What seems insurmountable at the mul-
tilateral level can be achieved at the regional or subregional level. See id. A nega-
tive consequence of hyper-regionalism may be the creation of a "multitude of
regional and subregional agreements with conflicting obligations." Id. Regional
agreements do not weaken the multilateral system, but rather promote the devel-
opment of trade law. See id. Even in cases where trade diversion does occur, re-
gional trade pacts do not impede broader efforts to reduce trade barriers at a mul-
tilateral level. See A Question of Preference: Do Regional Trade Agreements
Encourage Free Trade?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1998, at 62 (discussing effects of
regionalism on efforts to liberalize the global economy). There is no definite an-
swer as to whether trade agreements encourage free trade or create more bounda-
ries through proto-protectionist conduct among regional bloc members. See id.
(concluding that regionalism is neither good nor bad for free trade). What is clear,
however, is that there is no shortage of regional pacts dealing with trade. See id.
(stating that there are now at least eighty regional pacts). Nor is there a dearth of
opportunities for hyper-regionalism involving the United States. For the Clinton
Administration, any move towards trade liberalization, be it at a bilateral, regional,
or global level, particularly in an era where a global recession appears around the
comer, is a good thing.
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III. UNILATERALISM: A POST-MODERN
APPROACH TO UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY
On May 1, 1997, Undersecretary Eizenstat told the United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:
[T]he United States must continue to lead in opening up the arteries of
trade in the international trading system... Our continuing leadership in
opening markets is essential to enhancing the prosperity and security of
the American people in the 21' century and binding the poples of the
world together in a chain of prosperity and shared interests.
This statement correctly defines the Clinton Administration's trade
policy: unilateralism.
Although unilateral trade policies appear defeating to multilateral
and regional policies, it is only natural that the ground of the trade
policy debate has shifted in this manner.
[T]he suggestion that fair trade must be pursued as an explicit policy ob-
jective has forced the United States government into bilateral and unilat-
eral actions in the trade field, going beyond or simply ignoring GATT
rules. This implies that multilateral provisions and processes have been
unable to produce equitable outcomes, and all that is left is self-help."
As Eizenstat rightfully points out, United States policy is about
"enhancing the prosperity and security of the American people in the
21' century," not any other people. 'O Despite the encouraging eco-
nomic numbers that President Clinton provided to the American
people in his State of the Union address, there is bad news on the in-
ternational trade front.' The United States trade deficit continues to
widen to record levels. For 1998, the United States overall trade
deficit reached $233.4 billion"2-an all time high-which is a 50.4%
178. Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 2.
179. PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 28
(1993) (analyzing United States trade policy following the Uruguay Round of
GATT talks).
180. See Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 2.
181. See State of the Union Address, supra note 79.
182. See Martin Crutsinger, U.S. trade deficit surges to record high in '98, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., March 12, 1999, at C2 (remarking that "the United States has
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increase over the old mark of $153.4 billion set in 1997.8' 1999
looks like it will be no better as the monthly United States trade defi-
cit increased to a record $17 billion for the month of January 1999. 84
In light of this, it is no surprise that the United States is reacting in a
unilateral fashion.
After all, the same thing happened in the 1980s.'85 To counter an
internal economic decline, the United States borrowed heavily,
turned toward protectionism, and began a bilateral, and increasingly
unilateral, approach to trade relations with other states.'86 The United
clearly become the importer of first resort with the continuation of the Asian finan-
cial crisis").
183. See id. Department of Commerce Secretary William Daley responded to
the rise in the trade deficit:
Today's international trade figures continue to demonstrate the great strength of the
U.S. economy in the midst of a weaker global economy. America is now in the longest
ever peacetime economic expansion. The trade balance with Asia remains of greatest
concern-especially China and Japan .... We remain concerned about our trade defi-
cit even as the American economy continues to show remarkable strength under the
policies of President Clinton.
Statement by Commerce Secretary William Daley on the U.S. International Trade
Balance for November 1998, (visited Jan. 24, 1999) <http://204.193.543.2
/public.nsf/docs/international-trade-balance-for-November- 1998>.
184. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International
Accounts Data (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/tradgs-
d.htm#Balance> (providing 1998 trade deficit data); Gautam Malkani, US sees
trade deficit hit record $17bn, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999, at 5.
185. See generally DAVID CALLED, THE BANKRUPTING OF AMERICA (1991)
(detailing America's budget crisis of the 1980s). With the Reagan presidency, the
1980s saw a marked effort by the United States to reinvigorate itself. To counter
the perceived Soviet threat-the so-called "Evil Empire"-the administration
tumed to the military-industrial complex for growth. In the long run, this build-up
only worsened United States competitiveness. President Reagan's spendthrift pol-
icy undoubtedly encouraged a sharp fall in household savings and a sharp rise in
federal deficits. At times, the United States economy was on the verge of insol-
vency. The United States domestic manufacturing base and exports in manufac-
tured goods continued to shrink, leading some analysts to claim that the United
States was experiencing "deindustrialization." See BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNET
HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 6 (1982) (analyzing the per-
sonal and social costs of supply-side metaphysics of the Reagan Era); Guy de Jon-
quieres & Anatole Kaletsky, The Enemy Within: Can America Make It?, FIN.
TIMES, May 11, 1997, at 24 (observing that "[a]fter almost a century as the world's
pre-eminent industrial power, the US is being forced to acknowledge that its period
of unchallenged leadership is over").
186. See Tarullo, supra note 4, at 546.
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States then began to shift away from concentrating on multilateral
negotiating processes.' It consistently complained that the GATT
failed to create a level playing field. To many reactionary members
of the United States Congress, this system left United States firms
facing increasingly stronger foreign competitors domestically, and
protected competitors abroad. Consequently, Congress felt that uni-
lateral measures were needed to stem the trend against United States
manufacturers and fashioned a legislative response. This turn to-
wards protectionism is a natural reaction to the United States' rela-
tive decline in the world economy.' The United Kingdom reacted
similarly to its own decline in the early twentieth century. Jagdish
187. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 71 (1991) (concluding that due to the United States' economic de-
cline, the Reagan and Bush Administrations naturally focused on bilateral, rather
than multilateral, negotiations). In April 1985, the United States established a free
trade agreement with Israel to eliminate all tariffs on bilateral trade within ten
years. See Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M. 653.
The agreement eliminated all discrimination against United States exports caused
by preferences awarded to Western European states under the 1975 European
Community-Israel Free Trade Agreement. See id. Negotiations for the Free Trade
Agreement with Canada began in May 1986, when the parties contracted to elimi-
nate all tariffs on bilateral trade within ten years. See Free-Trade Agreement, Dec.
22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281. It also created innovative dispute
resolution mechanisms and pioneered to new approaches to liberalization in serv-
ices and investment. See id. These two free trade agreements demonstrated the
United States' chronic dissatisfaction with the GATT regime and the beginnings of
its dual approach to international trade. Canada, too, continues to look to its tradi-
tional bilateral partner south of the border for deeper trade links. See Edward Al-
den, Canada Steers to Deeper Trade Ties with U.S., FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at 4
(stating that Canada will focus on expanding its exports to the United States rather
than diversifying its trading partners). In particular, the Canadian government en-
courages small, domestically-oriented companies to begin exporting to the huge
market to the south. See id. But see Dearden, supra note 116, at 236-37 (explaining
that not extending the NAFTA to Chile caused Canada to negotiate its own deal
with Chile). Canada is considering expanding trade with Latin America further,
and may become an associate member of Mercosur. See Dearden, supra note 116,
at 236-37.
188. See Yen Gains As Japan Decides Against Interention, NAT'L PoST, Feb.
27, 1999, at C2 (tracking currency fluctuations over the past decade). The deterio-
ration in American economic strength can be shown in the dollar's decline vis-i-
vis the Japanese yen and the German mark over this past decade. In 1985, the dol-
lar traded for approximately 250 yen. In the summer of 1995, it traded for less than
100 yen, hitting an all time low of 79.85 during the week of April 16, 1995. The
dollar is currently trading at about 119 yen. See id.
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Bhagwati, an economic theorist, calls this phenomenon the "dimin-
ished giant syndrome."'89
It is not surprising that the United States government has grown
weary of the multilateral process; multilateralism is not a game that
the United States has won. Historically, the United States ran cur-
rent-account surpluses vis-ci-vis the rest of the world, and any frus-
tration with the GATT system was relieved by venting upon Japan.
Now, the United States runs high and persistent current-account defi-
cits, and a large portion of these deficits are with Japan. Most of the
trade deficit with the Japanese emanates from the automobile sector;
however, trade deficits exist across many sectors. Consequently,
while the United States rapidly became the world's largest debtor
state, Japan replaced the United States as the world's largest creditor
state. Clearly, Japan's gain has been the United States' loss.
The Asian financial crisis has not changed the trade relationship
between the United States and Japan. In October 1998, Japan's trade
surplus with the United States rose thirty-two percent, compared with
the prior year, totaling $5.9 billion.90 The rising trend in Japan's
trade surplus with the United States is forecasted to lead to a record
$56.1 billion for 1999.' 9' In addition to putting new pressures on the
American dollar, the Japanese trade surplus continues to open the
door to renewed trade friction. Consequently, Japan may have to
make further concessions to the United States.' 2
The Clinton Administration has followed President Reagan's eco-
nomic lead to a large degree. The biggest change in Clinton's trade
189. BHAGWATI, supra note 187, at 48 (explaining the rise in United States eco-
nomic protectionism as a reaction to its relative decline in economic power).
190. See Michiyo Nakamoto, Japan's Trade Surplus with US Rose 32% Last
Month, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at 4 (indicating that Japan's overall trade sur-
plus for October 1998 was up 23% since October 1997).
191. See Japan's Trade Surplus Up 40.1% in 1998, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1999
(reporting that Japan's overall trade surplus rose 40.1 percent in 1998 from the
surplus in 1997).
192. See generally Makoto Kuroda, Strengthening Japan-US Cooperation and
the Concept of Japan-US Free Trade Agreements, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY 121 (Jeffrey Schott ed., 1989) (stating that although many econo-
mists believe that United States trade deficits are due overwhelmingly to macro-
economic imbalances and there is little trade policy can do to correct them, these
imbalances are bound to occur periodically and will eventually self-rectify).
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policy, and the most disturbing to traditional trading partners of the
United States, is the use of United States power to bolster economic
growth at the risk of destabilizing traditional alliances. In 1998, the
Clinton Administration admonished Japan for not promoting suffi-
cient growth in Japanese domestic demand, as well as for failing to
restructure Japan's fragile financial market system and open Japa-
nese markets to assist the region out of economic crisis. For example,
during a diplomatic visit to Japan, President Clinton warned the
country that it risked provoking a protectionist backlash if it did not
dismantle its traditionally rigid trade barriers. 9' Moreover, President
Clinton urged Japan to stop unfairly undercutting competitors in
global markets.
While foreign policy pundits call this approach shortsighted,
Clinton advisors see it as pragmatic. The result is, however, that the
United States has angered many of its allies. Such an unrelenting fo-
cus on trade has managed to grind away the trust that Washington
had fashioned with its allies when facing a common Soviet enemy.
Such saber rattling by the Clinton Administration provoked Japan's
Justice Minister, Shozaburo Nakamura, to comment angrily that
"[United States] free-market capitalism is not free... [t]hey threaten
you right away with things like the Super 301 trade bill."'"
A. THE SUPER 301 MECHANISM-UNILATERALISM PAR
EXTRA ORDINAIRE
Unilateral sanctions have always been an important weapon in
America's arsenal of foreign trade policy actions.'" The use of uni-
lateral sanctions is, prima facie, not contrary to the international
trade rules on dispute resolution. Not only does the DSU provide for
193. See Gerard Baker, Clinton Warns Japan of "Retaliatory Protectionism"
Because of Trade Policy, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at 25 (reporting remarks by
President Clinton to United States and Japanese business people).
194. Michiyo Nakamoto, Japanese Minister Says Sorry to US, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
6, 1999, at 6 (reporting that Minister Nakamura later apologized for his remarks
and withdrew them as inappropriate).
195. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54
(1984) (commenting that strategies of unilateral sanctions are sometimes referred
to as "tit-for-tat"); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists,
75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 306, 308 (1981) (explaining that this game of logic is simi-
lar to the "Prisoner's Dilemma").
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"cross-retaliation,"' 96 but unilateral actions remain the predominant
tool of enforcing a Contracting Party's rights under the GATT and
the WTO. The threat of such retaliatory measures, however, has
really embodied the unilateral spirit of United States trade policy.
The Trade Act of 1974 includes provisions that require an admini-
stration to self-initiate Section 301 investigations in specific cases,
thus allowing special retaliatory measures. 9 7 The Super 301 Mecha-
nism,' 9 effected by The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988,99 is the most powerful tool authorizing the President unilater-
ally to impose trade sanctions against foreign governments. Section
301(a) mandates government action in cases where a foreign gov-
ernment violates an international trade agreement with the United
States.2°° In cases in which a foreign act, policy, or practice is "unrea-
sonable or discriminatory and burdens and restricts United States
commerce" but does not violate any international trade agreement,
Section 301(b) provides for "discretionary" action.2"' In addition to
196. See DSU, supra note 44, art. 1.
197. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 2414(a)(1) (1994) (outlining the investigation proce-
dure).
198. See Trade Act of 1974 sec. 301, 19 U.S.C. sec. 2411 (1994) [hereinafter
Super 301 Mechanism]. After the use or threat of use of the Super 301 mechanism,
the most egregious case of unilateralism concerns the use of extraterritorial laws to
promote United States trade policies abroad. The United States government has
promulgated laws that allow United States nationals to sue foreign firms that use
property in Cuba confiscated from them after the 1959 revolution. See Cooper, su-
pra note 26, at 392 (stating that the Helms Burton Act not only violates interna-
tional norms, but it is also bad for foreign relations). The House of Representatives
passed legislation similar to the Helms-Burton Act on June 19, 1996, aimed at re-
stricting foreign firms from doing business in Libya and Iran. See Wynn H. Segall,
Running On Empty: U.S. Economic Sanctions and Export Controls in 1997, 32
INT'L LAW. 271, 271 (1998) (detailing other extraterritorial measures). The United
States also imposed extraterritorial legislation regarding trade with Burma and Su-
dan. See id. While a form of unilateralism, specific notions and practices of extra-
territoriality are not within the scope of this Article.
199. Pub. L. No 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. sec.
2411).
200. 19 U.S.C. sec. 2411. Section 301(a) applies when the United States is un-
able to exercise its rights under any trade agreement, when a foreign country vio-
lates or denies the United States benefits under any trade agreement, or when a
foreign country unjustifiably burdens or restricts United States commerce. See id.
sec. 241 l(a)(1) (delineating the mandatory actions of the USTR).
201. See id. sec. 2411(b) (delineating the discretionary actions of the USTR).
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retaliation, the statute provides for a number of alternative possible
actions, including negotiating agreements to eliminate the impugned
practice or its harmful effect on United States commerce, or provid-
ing compensation to the United States in the form of trade conces-
sions on other goods or services.2'
Under the Super 301 mechanism, the USTR identifies "priority
foreign country practices, the elimination of which is likely to have
the most significant potential to increase United States exports.""
Moreover, the statute requires the United States government to pub-
lish an annual list of trading partners engaging in unfair trading
practices, thereby putting targeted countries under pressure to alter
their allegedly unfair trading behavior. '  Moreover, the statute pro-
vides for mandatory investigations of any "priority" trading states " -
because of a "pattern" of trade-distorting practices and non-tariff
trade barriers.0°
The designation of priority status is often a precursor to unilateral
trade sanctions or the threat thereof. For example, South Korea has
taken extraordinary steps just to avoid receiving "priority" status on
the annual list compiled under United States Super 301 legislation.2°'
South Korea negotiated to curtail its exports and bring its trade prac-
tices into line with demands made by the United States government,
202. See id. sec. 2411(c)(1)(D) (authorizing the USTR to "enter into binding
agreements" with the violating country).
203. See id. see. 2420(a)(1)(B) (providing the USTR with authority to identify
trade expansion priorities).
204. See id. sec. 2241(b) (requiring the federal government to compile an annual
report that identifies market barriers and unfair trade actions).
205. See 19 U.S.C. sec. 2420(b). In addition, the Super 301 mechanism requires
the USTR to identify priority countries that deny "adequate and effective protec-
tion of intellectual property rights" and that are not taking the necessary measures
to address the problem. See id. sec. 2242(b)(1) (explaining special rules for the
identification of priority countries).
206. See id. sec. 2411(d)(3)(B)(IV)(ii) (outlining what persistent patterns of
conduct trigger priority status).
207. See Deborah McGregor, US Augments Weaponry for Trade Disputes, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at 6 (discussing the renewal of Super 301 authority and its
use by the Clinton Administration as an effective tool to promote American eco-
nomic interests).
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reinforcing the effectiveness of Super 301 authority to policymakers
in Washington.2 8
Despite the availability of such strong retaliatory sanctions under
Section 301, the United States prefers to begin by threatening unilat-
eral sanctions at the negotiating table.2' The Clinton Administration
has proven that explicit threats of unilateral actions produce results
and most certainly concessions. Those who use advocate these tactics
"are not advocating protection per se, but they are willing to use
protection as a bargaining threat-a bluff that they are presumably
willing to see carried out, at least occasionally." 10
B. A NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUE - RESIDUAL UNILATERALISM AND
THE FTAA
Before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Clinton Admini-
stration claimed that Japan played the protectionist game. Then-
USTR Kantor claimed that Japan discriminated against American
firms in its public-sector procurement practices, and may have
breached the 1990 bilateral agreement concerning the purchase of
211supercomputers. When Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
visited Washington in April 1993, President Clinton talked tough
about market access.
This was the precursor to Kantor's biggest confrontation with To-
kyo in the spring of 1995, which involved the United States' com-
plaint that Japan's spare automobile parts market favored domestic
208. See id. (mentioning that a 1997 investigation under United States law into
Korean barriers to imported motor vehicles led to a market access agreement).
USTR Barshefsky proclaims that this market access agreement with Korea demon-
strates the effectiveness of the Super 301 mechanism. See id.
209. See VERDIER, supra note 31, at 280.
210. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 106 (1990)
(stating that some economists argue that some protectionism is necessary in order
to lower the trade deficit).
211. See George Graham & Peter Norman, US Acts Against Japan on Trade:
Clinton Takes Tougher Stance to Force Opening of Foreign Markets, FIN. TIMES,
May 1, 1993, at 1 (characterizing Japan's response to the United States' threats as
immediately hostile); Michiyo Nakamoto, Tokyo Defies US Anger Over
Supercomputer, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at 5 (reporting that Japan "brushed aside
US criticism of its supercomputer procurement policy" and installed a Japanese-
made supercomputer).
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firms over foreign firms. The United States threatened to impose pu-
nitive tariffs on Japanese luxury car imports if Japan did not open its
markets to more American car dealerships and American car parts.""
Just a few hours before the United States was due to impose punitive
tariffs on imports of Japanese luxury cars, a deal was struck.!" The
Japanese seemingly gave in to United States demands and made
amends. 4 The Japanese and United States governments had been
through this routine before, avoiding trade wars each time.2" The
United States government thereby learned that it could pursue a hard-
line confrontational strategy to get its way, under the guise of open-
ing markets for "free and fair trade."z' 6
The next big showdown should be steel imports from Japan, an is-
sue that has raised the ire of steel manufacturers in the United States.
In his State of the Union Address on January 19, 1999, President
Clinton was clear: "We must enforce our trade laws when imports
unlawfully flood our nation. I have already informed the government
of Japan that if that nation's sudden surge of steel imports into our
country is not reversed, America will respond."2" The United States
has responded. The United States House of Representatives voted on
March 17, 1999, to pass a bill establishing quotas on steel imports to
212. See Buy My Cars or Else: What Happened to America's Belief in Free
Trade?, ECONOMIST, May 13, 1995, at 16 (criticizing the United States tactic of
threatening sanctions in order to open Japan's automobile market); Gerard Baker,
Driven Off the Oriental Highway: Japan is Crowing Over its tictor' in the US Car
Clash, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 1995, at 7 (noting that Japan's refusal to bow to Ameri-
can pressure for explicit numerical targets won widespread global approval).
213. See Clinton's Phoney Peace, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 13 (reporting
that the trade agreement between the United States and Japan narrowly avoided
sanctions).
214. But see Baker, supra note 212, at 7 (observing that, at the heart of the dis-
pute, the United States failed to force Japan to do anything it did not want to do).
215. See VERDIER, supra note 3 1, at 280 (stating that even the European Eco-
nomic Community Commission preferred to deal with the Japanese via regulation,
i.e., anti-dumping, local-content and origin rules). The United States' propensity to
negotiate arose from the unique configuration of the policy process-executive,
with a pocket of pressure. See id. According to one academic, "[a]n active trade
diplomacy derives from a subtle mixture of credibility and inflexibility." Id.
216. See Low, supra note 179, at 28 (elaborating that "the absence of fairness in
trade relations bespeaks the need for greater intervention and planning in the do-
mestic economy to avoid the privations that will follow from foreign foul play").
217. State of the Union Address, supra note 79.
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counteract the dumping of Japanese and other countries' steel in
American markets.1 8
Japan is not alone in raising the ire of the White House. There
seems to be a constant flurry of trade war threats emanating from the
White House. Brazil, China, India, Japan, and other states have been
the subject of the rancor of the Clinton Administration. Currently, the
European Union is in the sights of American unilateral trade policy
for its Banana Regime. 9 Following the report of the Dispute Panel
Board considering the European Union's impugned policy, the
Clinton Administration maintained that the European Union had not
altered the Bananas Regime. While the United States government
asked the original WTO panel to decide whether the new banana im-
port regime complied with earlier WTO rulings, the United States
also threatened Super 301 sanctions and allegedly rebuffed en-
treaties from the European Union's Trade Commissioner.2 ' After the
USTR released a list of European products subject to unilateral re-
taliatory duties under the Super 301 mechanism, it became clear the
United States government was playing hardball.222 WTO concessions
on certain products, covering trade of about $520 million, were
scheduled for suspension by the United States government. 22' This
value was designed, in accordance with the DSU, to equal the esti-
mated amount of annual harm to the United States economy as a re-
sult of the European Union's Banana Regime. 4
218. See Nancy Dunne, House votes for quotas on steel imports, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1999, at 4. At the writing of this Article, it appears that this bill may run
into opposition in the United States Senate. See id. at 8.
219. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the Ba-
nanas Regime); see also Barshefsky Testimony, supra note 167, at 1 (stating that
"[o]ur relationship with the European Union creates immense mutual benefit,
which we can further strengthen; but it is marked by serious disputes which we
must solve").
220. See Guy de Jonqui~res, US Escalates Trade Dispute with European Union
over Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at I (stating that the United States
threatened sanctions upon sixteen types of European Union exports and planned to
seek WTO authorization to implement them).
221. See de Jonqui~res, supra note 57, at 3.
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There were a number of public criticisms of the United States re-
sort to unilateral measures, particularly while the case was in the
midst of the WTO dispute settlement process.2' The European Union
warned that the retaliatory sanctions risked damaging transatlantic
relations and the multilateral trading system, and that Europe would
robustly respond to such sanctions. "6 Sir Leon Brittan called the
threatened sanctions list, "unilateralism at its worse."c27 Jacques
Santer, European Commission President, wrote a personal letter to
President Clinton stating that Super 301 sanctions would be mis-
guided]m Subsequently, the European Union threatened to test the
legality of the United States government's Super 301 mechanism in
the WTO.22 After the European Union agreed to send the matter to
WTO arbitration, Washington agreed to postpone its request for
authorization of sanctions by the WTO. At the time of this writing,
the sanctions continue to be looming as last-minute negotiations
between United States and European Union officials continue at the
WTO. They may get results. As one former United States trade offi-
cial explained, "Super 301 can be more effective as a threat than
anything else., 230 The United States has also threatened the use of
sanctions against the European Union under its Super 301 mecha-
nism for the dispute over hormone-treated beef. Similar in exercise
to the USTR's actions over the bananas dispute with the European
225. See Neil Buckley, U.S. "Unilateralism" Attacked, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1998, at 3 (reporting the European Union concern that the United States increas-
ingly takes the law into its own hands).
226. See Neil Buckley, European Union Promises A Fight if U.S. Imposes
Sanctions Over Banana Battle, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at I (quoting a Euro-
pean Union official as stating: "[i]f the U.S. has a problem, it should use the proper
channels").
227. de Jonquinres, et al., supra note 220, at I.
228. See Neil Buckley, EC President Appeals to U.S. in Banana-Trade Dispute,
FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1998, at 5 (reporting President Santer's response to the threat
of Super 301 sanctions as advocating "shared leadership" between the United
States and the European Union rather than sanctions-inspired divisiveness).
229. See Buckley, supra note 64, at 4.
230. Id. (quoting Bill Merkin, vice president of Strategic Planning, Inc., of
Washington, D.C.).
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Union, a preliminary "hit-list" of European Union exports liable to
sanctions was released."'
Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that the United States gov-
ernment has become intent on pursuing policies that further demon-
strate its spirit of unilateralism. It is not just the retaliatory regime
that comes with violations or impairments of trade benefits where
unilateralism is exhibited. Such a spirit of unilateralism even per-
vades the multilateral and regional bargaining arena. The early
FTAA negotiations are a case in point. Although initially intended to
establish a launch date for formal negotiations for the world's largest
regional trading bloc, the talks in Brazil erupted in a dispute between
Washington and Mercosur over the speed of the negotiation proc-
ess.232 The United States wished to "rush ahead" with negotiations,
while the Mercosur states preferred a slower-bum approach.233 As the
conference wound down, USTR Barshefsky became so incensed by
the Latin American trade representatives' intransigence that she
heavily criticized the deputy ministers' draft declaration and threat-
ened to leave unless an agreement was reached on the FTAA.1  In
her attempts to bring a comprehensive trade pact more quickly, she
nearly scuttled the whole concept.
2
1
231. See Report of the Appellate Body on EC-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), Jan. 16, 1999, WTO Docs. WT/DS26/AB/R and
WT/DS48/AB/R; Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Press Release: USTR Publishes
Preliminay List of Products ion Preparation to Exercise WTO Rights on Beef
Trade Issue (Mar. 22, 1999), available in <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/03/
99-27.html> (reporting the preliminary "hit-list"); see also Guy de Jonqui6rcs,
Transatlantic beef warriors steer clear of open conflict, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999,
at 8.
232. See Christie, supra note 135.
233. See id.
234. See Michael Christie, Mercosur Hails Americas Trade Talks Win Over US,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, May 17, 1997, p. unavail. online.
235. See Avinash K. Dixit, Trade Policy: An Agenda for Research, in
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY, supra note 6, at 283, 299 (discussing the impact of the
United States during FTAA meetings in Brazil). Dixit commented that "[m]any
actions of trade policy are influenced by explicit or tacit threats-that is, expecta-
tions of what some other country ... will do if we do not take this action." Id. ie
adds that no systematic economic analysis of such threats has been completed and
in-depth discussion is conjectural. See id.
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Brazil, as Mercosur's defacto leader, has strategically avoided the
term "hemispheric integration" and openly stated its intention to
strengthen the Southern Cone before joining the FTAA. On May 17,
1997 Brazilian newspapers proudly ran headlines claiming that the
United States had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the
South America's trade bloc in key ministerial Free Trade Talks.2:' A
front-page headline of the Estado de Minas daily gloated "The
United States surrenders to Mercosur," while the national 0 Globo
newspaper shouted, "Mercosur wins and the United States is de-
feated. ' 37 The newspapers claimed that the Mercosur states with-
stood pressure from the United States for speedier progress during
ministerial talks developing the FTAA.2"-
Formal negotiations establishing the FTAA were agreed upon in
the Joint Ministerial Declaration of Belo Horizonte.2"- The thirty-four
FTAA signatory countries, however, did not shore up wide differ-
ences regarding the nature of the talks; they scheduled another min-
isterial meeting for the following year in Costa Rica, a postponement
Washington opposed.2 * The result was an agreement to continue
talks, albeit not as quickly as the United States desired.
The Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago managed to clear
up some negative sentiment, but the talk of winners and losers re-
flects a zero-sum game rather than strategic long-term relationships.
An example of a zero-sum approach is evident in the United States
unilaterally-influenced negotiation style, which is to demand liberali-
zation in one sector, and claim that other countries' offers are not
enough to justify opening the United States markets."4 If states do
not comply with demands, the United States then promptly with-
draws from talks.
236. See Deborah McGregor, U.S. to Reinstate Controversial Hitlist for "Un-
fair" Trading, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at 1: see also Christie, supra note 234.
237. Christie, supra note 234.
238. See id. (discussing obstacles in Mercosur and United States trade negotia-
tions).
239. See Christie, supra note 135.
240. See Christie, supra note 234.
241. See Eggertson, supra note 157, at B2 (arguing that the United States lost an
opportunity to reach an agreement on financial services by abandoning negotia-
tions).
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This negotiating style is part of a repeated unilateral spirit in
United States government negotiations. For example, at the May
1997 APEC meeting in Montreal, USTR Barshefsky urged American
trading partners to allow majority foreign ownership and branch
banking access to their institutions and banks.2 42 The USTR also
warned that it would withdraw from scheduled talks if Latin Ameri-
can and Asian countries did not enhance their offers by July 1997.143
Additionally, in the 1998 Kuala Lumpur meeting of APEC, the
summit ended with a row over Japanese intransigence over trade lib-
eralization measures and outbursts from the USTR referring to Japa-
nese checkbook diplomacy.24 It is little wonder that the last
GATT/WTO trade agreement took seven years to conclude.
Arguably, use of United States trade laws to force open markets is
a striking rejection of multilateral free trade. This strategy under-
mines the purpose of the GATT and the WTO, pushing countries into
defensive, market-sharing pacts with the United States. The Clinton
Administration has adopted what it calls "WTO-plus," maintaining
that unilateral policies are consistent with-or even complementary
to-the multilateral mechanism already in place. Irrespective of this
stance, it is increasingly clear that the United States government is
using unilateral measures, self-initiated and provided for under do-
mestic legislation, to force its trade agenda abroad. Instead of relying
on the multilateral framework of the WTO or the regional trading
blocs to which the United States is a member, the Clinton Admini-
stration is demonstrating a unilateral spirit, which ensures that
America always comes first.
IV. THE UNITED STATES' POST-MODERNIST
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The world of international trade has long been filled with intel-
lectual inconsistencies: "[tirade policy is not a stable category across
time and borders. It can be defined but only in the most general
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See Peter Montagnon & Sheila McNulty, Trade Liberalisation Accord
Thwarted APEC: Japan & U.S. Exchange Blows at Asia-Pacific Summit, FIN.
TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1998, at 3 (stating that the Japanese perceived USTR Barshef-
sky's remarks as "evil" and defamatory).
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terms, as the policy that purports to affect trade flows between do-
mestic and world markets. Any finer definition must concern itself
with historically contingent events." 24 '
The Cold War gave the capitalistic free world a meaning, a direc-
tion, and a purpose-all of which combined to provide a form of
metanarrative that guided policymaking. With the end of the Cold
War, and the rise of liberal democracies across the globe,2" the clash
of the two modernist ideologies-the capitalist West and the socialist
East-evolved into a more complex set of competing blocs.4' Inter-
national trade policy in a multipolar world is much more difficult to
manage than it was in a bipolar world. Today, few clear dividing
lines exist; there are only competing narratives.
The United States' post-modem approach to trade policy has cre-
ated a plethora of options and opportunities, thus accommodating all
interests.'4 For the United States, however, the flexibility of its inter-
ests depends upon balancing the maintenance of liberalization meas-
ures between Japan and the European Union and demands for con-
cessions from these same trading partners.249 Most important is the
spirit with which policymakers make choices in light of the post-
modern world of numerous opportunities and threats.' As Charles
Jencks explains:
245. VERDIER, supra note 31, at 48.
246. See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 37 (analyzing the sustainability of
emerging liberal democracies post Cold War).
247. See Allott, supra note 18, at 1393 ("With the end of the Cold War, Russia
reverted to an untidy genetic status, in which the sub-nation of Russia once again
may come to imperialize some or all of the other sub-nations. The United States is
left to struggle with its identity in new and especially difficult circumstances.").
248. See VERDIER, supra note 31, at 289 (discussing opportunities for domestic
and exporting interests).
249. See id. (stating that this presents a new situation for the White House since
there is no longer a communist threat); see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 37, at 283.
The United States and other liberal democracies will have to come to grips with the
fact that, with the collapse of the communist world, the world in which they live is less
and less the old one of geopolitics, and that the rules and methods of the historical
world are not appropriate to life in the post-historical one.
Id.
250. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 12.
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[T]he post-modem condition ... has as many negative as positive tenden-
cies, and they come as a package. The increase in communication (and the
information glut and advertisement), the growth of knowledge (and the
consumer society), the rise of leisure (and of Disneyland simulacra), the
flowering of Post-Fordism (and the insecurity of workers), the emergence
of a new world order (and the Pax Americana), the EC, GATT and global
economy (and the Third World debt and IMF riots)-for every Rositive
post-modem trend there is a corresponding negative consequence.
The world depends on trade and cannot do without it. The global
economy is a part of modem life and the flow of capital, technology,
and labor at a transnational level continues to increase. With all this
movement and the lack of a single, cohesive trade theory, however,
there is growing consternation among United States lawmakers as to
the fate and direction of United States trade policy.252
251. Jencks, supra note 16, at 13; see also Zamora, supra note 147, at 627 (cit-
ing BOAVENTUSA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE (1995)). de
Sousa Santos characterizes policies of the post-modem world as "transnationaliza-
tion of nation-state legal regulation." Id. The combination of domestic and intema-
tional political forces concurrent with new forms of technologies and business or-
ganization makes for blurred lines of jurisdiction and control. See id. According to
Professor Santos:
We may be witnessing the emergence of a new form of plurality of legal orders: partial
legal fields constituted by relatively unrelated and highly discrepant logics of regula-
tion coexisting in the same state legal system. As it loses coherence as a unified agent
of social regulation, the state becomes a network of microstates, each one managing a
partial dimension of sovereignty (or of the loss of it) with a specific regulatory logic
and style.
Id.; see also James M. Cooper, Towards a New Architecture: Creative Problem
Solving and the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 297, 321-22 (1998) (stating
that family, ethnicity, kin, language, and religion are traditions that bind citizens as
much as traditional juriscapes, such as city, state, and country). Non-traditional ju-
riscapes have their own system of enforcement and conduct exclusive of state con-
trol. See id.
252. See Trade Priorities in The Clinton Administration: Hearings Before the
House International Relations Comm., 105th Cong. 1 (1997) (statement of Rep.
Gilman) (stating that "[b]oth critics and supporters of the administration's trade
policy agree that the trade policy agenda has lost its primacy in our overall foreign
policy"). United States Senator Dan Coats, Chairman of the Senate Arms Services
Subcommittee on Air and Forces, stated, "If there is a coherent, articulated foreign
policy-I don't know what it is ... It appears that our actions do not match our
rhetoric. It seems that the policy is constantly changing." Coats Questions Secre-
tay of Defense and Chairman of Joint Chiefs on Military Readiness Issues, News
Release of United States Senator for Indiana Dan Coats, Washington, D.C., Oct. 6,
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There are a number of competing interests in balancing American
trade policy. According to Eizenstat:
Economics is certainly not the only element of our foreign policy, nor do I
intend to view every foreign policy issue through a commercial prism.
But in the post-Cold War world, economics is increasingly central to
maintaining United States leadership, advancing the interests of the
American people, and building a more stable and prosperous world. "
The Administration's trade policy is truly one of quantity, not qual-
ity. USTR Barshefsky explained that, "[a]s you look at the last year
alone the number of major agreements (bilateral, sectoral, regional,
multilateral) ... demonstrates that this administration is as aggres-
sively pursuing trade policy as part of foreign policy, as well as eco-
nomic policy, as it has over the preceding three and a half years.":"
In reality then, the trade policy appears as a combination of all
three approaches. There are always elements of unilateralism in both
multilateral and regional negotiating exercises, just as the regional
process is multilateral in nature. While President Clinton is commit-
ted to opening markets, he has engaged in much more brinkmanship,
by threatening unilateral measures, than his predecessors have."
"The policy actions thus provoked blend increased protection in the
domestic market and ever more strident demands for trade liberali-
zation by trading partners. The threat of increased protection backs
up the demands for trade liberalization."2
This method of conducting trade talks may not be such an odd
strategy. There is some overlap between the unilateral, regional, and
multilateral approaches to trade policy on the global level." For ex-
1998 (on file with American Universit, hIternational Law Review).
253. Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 1.
254. Trade Priorities, supra note 106, at 11.
255. See Guy de Jonqui~res, US to Stay Firm on Trade Barriers, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1999, at 6 (noting that the banana dispute between the United States and the
European Union is a critical test in the enforcement of international trade rights).
256. Low, supra note 179, at 28.
257. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 12 (characterizing international trade law
regime as "a melange of law and non-law, institutions and non-institutions, a scat-
tered array of obligations and sites for bilateral or multilateral engagement").
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ample, Avinash Dixit suggests that the very negotiating process in a
multilateral framework implies a certain element of unilateralism:
In reality the policy choices of two or more governments interact in many
ways. The most visible example of this is the joint decision-making proc-
ess consisting of the rounds of negotiations under GATT. More subtly,
any one country, when evaluating its policy choices, must be mindful of
the reaction or retaliations that are likely from other countries.
8
To come to an agreement at any level, there must be agreement by
the parties to the negotiations. A unilateral decision, internally
driven, is the step that brings the external relations to fruition. Be-
cause of internal decision-making, consensus and bargains build in-
ternational agreements. As Philip Allott explains:
International social progress comes, if at all, as an incidental external con-
sequence of internal activities ... and, especially, as a by-product of the
wealth-creating and wealth distributing effects of international capitalism,
including rudimentary cooperation among some of the governmental
managers of international capitalism (in GATT, the IMF, OECD, the
European Community, the Group of Seven).
259
Overlap also exists in developing bilateral-or nascent regional-
relationships and relationships that can be leveraged in an increas-
ingly global multilateral trading system. In short, the spirits are
blurred, as demonstrated by the relationship between the United
States and the European Union. While both partners require partici-
pation and access to each other's markets for expanded global trade,
there is always friction concerning trade relations. This friction oc-
curs at all three levels as threats of unilateral action moves towards
regional consolidation and the use of multilateral mechanisms, such
as the DSU.
For example, when the European Union Banana Regime com-
plaint was before the WTO, German Christian Democrat Peter Kit-
tlemann urged a bilateral settlement with the United States similar to
an agreement that prevented a clash in the WTO over the United
States Helms-Burton law, which penalized foreign firms investing in
258. See Dixit, supra note 232, at 298.
259. PHILIP ALLOTr, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE WORLD 17 (1989).
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Cuba.26° At a European Union-United States meeting on May 28,
1997, President Clinton indicated to his European counterparts that
the United States would like to resolve the WTO bananas case in
such a way that protects the interests of the Caribbean exporters,
while eliminating discrimination against other exporters. Here, the
bilateral relationship, as part of the Transatlantic Marketplace, may
become more regional once a free trade deal is signed and pose bene-
fits for the entire multilateral system.
In the past, bilateral negotiations were critical for the success of
GATT talks. From the initial Geneva Round in 1947 through the
Dillon and Kennedy Rounds, much of the progress on tariff reduc-
tion was done through direct United States-Europe discussions.26'
Clearly, the European Union also believes that negotiation is the best
approach for developing long-term partnerships. " The United States
and the European Union rely on deal-making as the mainstay of trade
relations between trading partners.
In fact, the entire world trading system relied on a last-minute bi-
lateral deal between the two parties. On December 15, 1993, Presi-
dent Clinton notified congressional leaders that an agreement was
reached to conclude the Uruguay Round of negotiations of the
GATT. The United States Congress had previously imposed a dead-
line for the Clinton Administration to reach an agreement with the
116 other negotiating countries. Ultimately, the agreement incorpo-
rated more than five hundred pages and contained forty separate
agreements. The crux of the matter, however, was a deal with the
European Union over outstanding issues such as French government
260. EU Says it has Grounds to Appeal WTO Banana Ruling, REUTERS EUR.
UNION COMMUNITY REP'T, May 14, 1997, p. unavail. online (describing Kittle-
mann's fear that if the United States won its case before the WTO, the WTO would
be more likely to support overturning European Union import bans on meat from
animals treated with growth hormones).
261. See ROBERT K. PATERSON, CANADIAN REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENTS 25 (1986) (stating that GATT tariff bargaining tended to
be an overwhelmingly bilateral affair, since there was often only one principal
supplier of a given product imported by a Contracting Party).
262. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 20 (describing the European Union as "the
most developed international regime" that has a reciprocal negotiations structure in
place to reduce impediments to the free movement of goods).
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subsidies to the French film industry and the nation's farmers.2 61 In
the end, the most important multilateral agreement was accomplished
through bilateral talks, a method of trade policy negotiations the
United States used consistently over the last six years.
Following the European Union-United States summit at The
Hague, Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg trum-
peted the mix of bilateralism for multilateral purposes:
I think the most important thing coming out of today's summit was the
sense that the cooperation and the interaction that takes place in these
summits now is not limited to or even necessarily focused solely on bilat-
eral issues between the United States and the European Union, but rather
on how the United States and the European Union and the European Un-
ion countries can cooperate on broader global and international issues. 2
The United States-European Union relationship is not the only
framework where a blurring among trade negotiation approaches ex-
ists. All the regional blocs have some recourse to the multilateral
process of the WTO during negotiations conducted in their respec-
tive contexts. Many liberalization programs agreed upon during re-
gional bloc talks have to pass through the WTO before a critical
mass of support is gained, allowing for some of the larger trading
partners to agree to cut their own tariffs. APEC summiteers recog-
nize this process and provide for it in the declarations that follow
their meetings:
The expansion of trade and investment remain essential elements of our
economic recovery and we reiterate the need for liberal and open markets
263. See Coup de Grace, Coup de Foudre: The Uruguay Round, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 28, 1992, at 70 (stating that France strongly insisted that the European Un-
ion's common agricultural policy be protected from reform in GATT negotiations);
see also From Uruguay to Marrakesh: World Trade, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994,
at 73 (citing disagreements between the United States and the European Union on
issues of trade); Standard Deviations, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1994, at G32 (examining
unresolved trade issues in the third world such as environmental and labor stan-
dards).
264. Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Deputy Nat 'l Security Advi-
sor James Steinberg and Assistant to the President for Int'l Economic Aff at the
Nat ' Economic Council Dan Tarullo, and Press Secretary Mike McCurry (state-
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and an enabling environment for investment. We consider it particularly
important that in the current circumstances, early progress be made on
broad-based multilateral negotiations in the WTO, achieving an overall
balance of interests of all members. We reaffirm our commitment to up-
hold and strengthen the multilateral trading system to ensure fair rules and
benefits for all. We urge the prompt accession to the WN'TO of applicants
in accordance with WTO rules, with a view towards achieving the univer-
sality of WTO membership.
During the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, after efforts to reach an
APEC trade liberalization agreement failed in nine sectors, the trade
ministers decided to send the entire set of proposals to the WTO. :  In
the face of Japanese intransigence, the synergy that exists among of
regional and global trading regimes was on full display.
The FTAA endorses the use of a multilateral bargaining process to
shape the talks that will end in 2005. No longer will there be a series
of bilateral exercises where Latin American countries compete
against each other and form an orderly line to accede to the NAFTA.
The Clinton Administration during the First Summit of the Americas
first envisaged this concept in Miami in 1994. Instead, the thirty-four
countries will bargain together, with different countries presiding
over nine negotiating groups that include sectors such as competition
policy, investment services, and subsidies. Moreover, the venue se-
lection is inherently multilateral, as the talks began in Miami, pro-
ceeded to Panama City, and then, finally, to Mexico City. The
chairmen of the talks will rotate, while the United States and Brazil
hold the last chair jointly. Multilateralism, then, becomes part of re-
gionalism by its very definition.
Multilateral talks are consistently subject to other issues on the
global agenda, some of which are not specifically trade-related. As a
result, there are issues that may further divide global trading partners.
Questions facing the trading partners include whether the GATT
265. APEC Economic Leaders' Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Strength-
ening the Foundations for Growth, Nov. 18, 1998, para. 13 (visited Jan. 25, 1999)
<http://vww.apec.org/leaders-declaration.htm>.
266. Montagnon & McNulty, supra note 163, at 3 (speculating that trade rela-
tions between the United States and Japan may weaken after harsh exchanges by
both parties).
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should become involved in social policy, labor standards , and hu-
man rights;2 8 whether it should venture into competition policy and
require certain minimum standards and movement towards harmoni-
zation; and, finally, whether new members like China, Saudi Arabia,
and Russia will qualify as developing countries and play an effective
role in the trading system.
Only flexible, non-traditional approaches can assist the United
States in navigating its way through these difficult waters. In so do-
ing, the plurality of United States trade policy continues to manifest
itself. Although the Clinton Administration has announced its inter-
est in multilateral solutions to international trade, unilateralism has
been the predominant feature. It is then difficult to understand what
is happening in the international trading arena if the United States is
without a clear policy agenda.269 We are charged "to explain why
new thinking about trade policy, thinking that may at times seems
abstract and only distantly related to the real problems that arise on a
daily basis, is important to practical people."27 Using a post-modem
approach may not adequately answer this call.
Moreover, to label the Clinton Administration's approach "post-
modem" may not be accurate. Simply, it may just be disorganized,
haphazard crisis management. Then again, since post-modernism is
described by what it is not-modernism-this may well be the case.
267. See generally Raj Bhala, Clarifying the Trade-Labor Link, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 11 (1998) (arguing that a link exists between workers' rights and a
liberalized legal regime for international trade).
268. See BHALA, supra note 149, at xiii. "The WTO and Multilateral Trade
Agreements and NAFTA, are examples of the broadening agenda in the field of
international trade law. No longer is this field just about reducing tariff and non-
tariff barriers." Id.
269. Krugman, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that "forward looking assessments
are necessary for a successful trade policy").
270. Id. at 1; see also Allott, supra note 18, at 1370.
In the economic field, the field of social transformation of the material world with a
view to human survival and prospering, those who control great systems of social
power are obliged to watch and wait as a totalized economic system of a nation or of
the world, which contains nothing but the willing and acting of human beings, alters
direction or dynamic, perhaps cyclically, as if it were a slow-witted monster with in-
stincts of its own, making and destroying human lives as random side-effects.
Allott, supra note 18, at 1370.
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Perhaps the metanarrative may be the best option; the total spirit
may well simply be to increase the economic well being of the
United States. The trifurcated policies, ones that blend, blur, and of-
ten counter-indicate are tools to create an international trading re-
gime that ensures a better future for the United States.
Presently, statistics and trends indicate that the United States is
continuing to lose its trading primacy and economic power. Of
course, this declining state may well be a function of old analysis to
what is a new global economic world.2'" Indeed, "[c]hanging global
circumstances and more sophisticated means of analysis demand that
free-trade-minded economists overhaul their arguments in order to
remain germane. ' 2n
No matter the methods of analysis or the modes by which we
structure our understanding and, therefore, our policy, the United
States government is not equipped to engage in the international
trading regime. Since Congress will not provide the tools to allow the
Administration to begin negotiations, negative consequences will en-
sue for future free trade talks, even with all the bravado about multi-
lateral and regional efforts.273 When President Clinton pulled his Fast
Track legislation from Congress in November 1997, it was clearly an
embarrassment. The results of the November 1998 congressional
elections were viewed as unhelpful in assisting Clinton's attempt to
achieve his ambitious trade agenda. 74
Fast track authority may well be an essential part of United States
trade leadership. As it did in the aftermath of the Second World War,
the United States must lead in expanding and liberalizing the inter-
national economic system. Washington should focus on stabilizing
271. See Dixit, supra note 232, at 283 (stating that "[r]ecent research contains
support for almost all the vocal and popular views on trade policy that only a few
years ago struggled against the economists' conventional wisdom of free trade").
272. Ehrlich, supra note 5, at 262.
273. See generally Craig VanGrasstek, Is the Fast Track Really Necessary?, 31
J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1997, at 97 (arguing that Fast Track, while an important
tool in the United States trade policy, is not imperative).
274. See Nancy Dunne, Clinton's Trade Agenda Still In Doubt: Poll Victory
House of Representatives Is Still Key to Fast Track, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at
8 (finding that the Democrats failed to elect enough members to push through their
trade initiatives).
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and strengthening the multilateral trading system, ensuring compli-
ance with economic agreements to which they are a party, and up-
dating the international world trading system by including within its
scope areas such as telecommunications and financial services. Con-
gress should consider providing broad Fast Track authority to the
President, thereby enabling the Clinton Administration to complete
its necessary work.27 ' Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan endorses the need for an open market and the reduction of
protectionism:
In this regard, drift toward protectionist trade policies, which are always
so difficult to reverse, is a much greater threat than is generally under-
stood. It is well known that erecting barriers to the free flow of goods and
services across national borders undermines the division of labor and
standards of living by impeding the adjustment of the capital stock to its
most productive uses. Not so well understood, in my judgment, is the im-
pact that fear of growing protectionism would have on profit expectations,
and hence on the current values of capital assets. Protectionism was a
threat to standards of living when capital asset values were low relative to
income. It becomes particularly pernicious in a environment, such as to-
276
day's, when that is no longer the case.
With a hostile Congress, Clinton's authority to negotiate interna-
tional treaties will continue to be negatively impacted, as will the
leadership role the United States takes in the world. No one under-
stands these issues better than Undersecretary Eizenstat. He has been
the point man to cut diplomatic losses with the United States trading
partners over the excesses of the Helms-Burton Act, and has studied
United States policy over the Swiss banking scandal. As an avid stu-
dent of the trading history of the United States, he was correct when
he stated:
Looking ahead to the enormous opportunities and challenges of the global
economy in the 21st century, one of our most important tasks is making
275. See Trade Priorities, supra note 106, at 9 (stating that "[t]he absence of
Fast Track authority is the single most important factor limiting our capacity at this
time to open markets and expand American exports.").
276. See Outlook for the State of the United States Economy: Hearings Before
the House Ways and Means Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (visited Mar. 10, 1999)
<http:www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/testimony/current/199901120.htm> (state-
ment of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Sys-
tem).
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sure we communicate to the American people in a very clear and concrete
fashion the ways international economic policy contributes to a more
prosperous America and a more stable world:
Perhaps he was right to start with Congress!"
277. Eizenstat Testimony, supra note 19, at 6,
278. See Jeffrey E. Green, Congress Wages War on Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
May 28, 1997, at A21 (arguing that Congress should not attempt to further non-
economic issues with trade).
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